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Abstract 
 
We investigate whether and how political systems affect the financial soundness of conventional and 
Islamic banks. Using factors extracted from principal component analysis, we find that Islamic banks 
underperform their conventional counterparts in more democratic political systems but outperform them 
in hybrid and Sharia’a-based legal systems. The findings reflect the challenges Islamic banks face in 
Western countries in terms of perception, financial infrastructure, and regulatory constraints while 
mirroring the recognition of their specificities and their cultural and religious compliance with Sharia’a 
law in Muslim countries. The findings are robust to a battery of alternative estimation techniques and 
methods of correcting standard errors.   
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1. Introduction 
More than five years after the beginning of the Arab Spring in 2010 (Ghosh, 2016), many Arab 
countries are still facing serious social and political tensions (as well as financial and economic 
instability), despite democratic elections that have led to new political regimes. Besides the Arab 
Spring, other episodes of political change have marked recent history, e.g., the transition from 
autocratic and communist regimes to democratic regimes in Europe and Latin America in the 1970s, 
1980s, and early 1990s (Faria and McAdam, 2015). Yet, in contrast to most of these political changes, 
an important feature of the Arab revolts is that religion is recognized as a major force in politics and 
can play a key role in motivating and governing people’s decisions. An important manifestation of 
this phenomenon is the choice between a democratic political system and a Sharia’a-based legal 
system. The outcome of this decision may have a direct influence on the country’s economic and 
financial conditions. 
Recently, several empirical studies have investigated the impact of the Arab Spring on the 
performance and stability of the banking sector. For instance, Bitar et al. (2016) find that the Arab 
Spring had a different effect on the performance and risk of conventional banks in Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries than in countries in the rest of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). 
Ghosh (2016) finds that the Arab Spring negatively affected the profitability and stability of both 
conventional and Islamic banks. In earlier contributions, Mahboub and Abdou (2012) and Khandelwal 
and Roitman (2013) show that the Arab Spring led to a sharp decrease in macroeconomic outputs, 
especially in the short- and medium-term. Finally, Awadallah (2013) finds that the economies of the 
Arab Spring countries lack a strong private sector due to fragmented markets and weak competition. 
Another set of empirical studies examines the influence of political connections and autocratic 
political systems on bank performance and economic growth. For example, Nys et al. (2015) find that 
politically connected banks in Indonesia are more capable of attracting deposits while Abdelsalam et 
al. (2017) find that politically connected banks in the MENA region are less efficient. As for 
economic growth, Khafagy (2017) and Commander (2017) report that autocratic governments exhibit 
opportunistic behavior and often badge themselves as reformers only to gain popularity, thus leading 
to a deterioration of countries’ economic situation. 
Our paper differs from these previous studies in three major respects; firstly, we use factors 
extracted from principal component analysis (PCA), instead of financial ratios, to examine bank 
financial soundness. Secondly, we examine the effect of political systems in general (not just during 
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times of upheaval) on the financial soundness of banks. Thirdly, we not only consider conventional 
banks but extend our analysis so that it also covers Islamic banks. In addition, our study covers a 
longer time period than most of the existing literature, beginning a decade before the Arab Spring, and 
thus considers the circumstances that led to these political changes. Our goal is to investigate the 
effect of various political systems on the financial soundness of the two bank types; specifically, we 
explore whether a Western democratic political system and a Sharia’a-based legal system have 
different effects on the financial soundness of conventional versus Islamic banks and investigate the 
potential reasons for these differences. 
Our study employs a three-stage approach. In the first stage, we apply PCA on twenty-nine 
measures of bank financial soundness. We use an initial sample of 729 banks (including 139 Islamic 
banks) in 33 developing countries for the period between 1999 and 2013. The results of the extracted 
components indicate that capital, efficiency, the volatility of returns, liquidity, the charging of rents 
for offering Sharia’a compliant products, profitability, and credit risk are the most informative 
indicators of Islamic banks’ financial soundness.  
In the second stage of our analysis, we follow a difference-in difference research design and use 
random-effect Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regressions to compare the financial soundness of 
conventional and Islamic banks. In contrast to Abedifar et al. (2013), Beck et al. (2013), and 
Alqahtani et al. (2016), our findings suggest that Islamic banks are more efficient, more profitable, 
slightly more capitalized and have more volatile earnings (are less stable) than their conventional 
counterparts. We also examine whether the political environment has the same effect on the financial 
soundness of Islamic banks compared to conventional banks, taking into consideration bank and 
country-level control variables. Our findings suggest that Islamic banks underperform their 
conventional counterparts in Western democratic nations but outperform them in countries that 
employ Sharia’a or hybrid legal systems. We argue that recognizing the Sharia’a law in a country’s 
political or legal system could be a valuable resource for Islamic banks, especially in highly religious 
countries. First, recognizing Islamic law may translate into regulatory authorities better understanding 
the specificities of Islamic banks, leading to better adapted regulatory guidelines and avoidance of 
potential double regulatory standards. Second, recognizing Sharia’a law may enhance people’s 
confidence, the public trust, and the reputation of Islamic banking institutions thus enabling them to 
more easily obtain resources in the form of deposits and sell their products to customers. Finally, in 
countries that have Sharia’a or hybrid legal systems, Islamic banks may benefit from the goodwill of 
religious depositors who believe that they preserve the Muslim culture and identity. Other than 
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political systems, our results also indicate that bank age, economic cycles, market discipline, and 
ownership dispersion are important determinants of Islamic banks’ financial soundness as well. 
In the third stage of our analysis, we use several additional tests to check the robustness of our 
results. First, we employ a propensity score matching (PSM) technique by matching observations of 
banks based on their probability of being Islamic. We continue to find evidence that Islamic banks are 
more capitalized, more efficient and profitable, and have lower credit risk than their conventional 
counterparts, while also having more volatile earnings. Second, we employ difference-in-difference 
(DID) estimation to compare changes in the financial soundness of both types of bank due to the Arab 
Spring. Our findings suggest that Islamic banks are less profitable and have more volatile earnings 
during the Arab Spring than conventional banks. Third, we use an instrumental variables (IV) 
approach to address endogeneity and correct for potential adverse selection problems. We also use a 
Heckman (1979) selection approach to correct for a potential self-selection bias. Our results confirm 
the previous findings and thus are not driven by endogeneity. Finally, we use truncated regressions 
with a Newey-West procedure to correct for autocorrelation among the residuals and again report very 
similar results.  
Our study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, previous empirical studies that 
compare the financial characteristics of Islamic and conventional banks are based on ratio analyses 
and often report mixed results. Banking institutions are complex organizations and the financial 
soundness of their investment portfolio depends on many factors. These factors can be internal ones 
such as bank age and experience or external ones such as economic conditions and political systems. 
Thus, simple ratio analyses cannot capture the complete picture of a bank’s financial soundness 
(Klomp and de Haan, 2012, 2014). Furthermore, in the context of Islamic banks, Johnes et al. (2014) 
argue that “the most severe drawback is the assumption underlying financial ratios of cost 
minimization or profit maximization” (pg. S96). In other words, the assumption that Islamic banks are 
excessive risk-taking and profit-maximizing organizations is unlikely to be wholly valid. Note that we 
do not completely dismiss the assumption; this is because there remain substantial divergences 
between what Sharia’a law ideally expects from Islamic banks and what has been applied in practice, 
where Islamic banks’ practices are often criticized for being indistinguishable from those of 
conventional banks (Khan, 2010). Nevertheless, a few studies – including the present one – consider a 
multi-faceted concept for bank financial soundness instead of one-dimensional measures (Canbas et 
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al., 2005; Shih et al., 2008; Klomp and de Haan, 2012, 2014).1 While a few empirical studies use 
principal component analysis (PCA) to examine the conventional banking sector’s financial 
soundness, no study has used PCA to evaluate the financial soundness of Islamic banks.  
Our second contribution relates to the newly emerging literature on the political environment 
(Bove et al., 2016; Boubakri and Saffar, 2016; Klomp and de Haan, 2016) and the literature on the 
effect of the Arab Spring (Mahboub and Abdou, 2012; Awadallah, 2013; Khandelwal and Roitman, 
2013; Bitar et al., 2016; Ghosh, 2016). We also focus on a set of countries of particular importance in 
areas that are characterized by a high concentration of political instability (Ghosh, 2016) and high 
corruption levels (Belkhir et al., 2016), in addition to a mix of weak democracies, monarchies and 
authoritarian regimes (Abdelsalam et al., 2017). Finally, we complement the literature on the 
important role played by religion in affecting the financial characteristics of Islamic banks (Beck et 
al., 2013; Abedifar et al., 2013; Mollah and Zaman, 2015). By comparing banks that operate in 
democratic political systems with those that operate in Sharia’a and hybrid legal systems, we show 
that Islamic banks appear to be less financially sound in more democratic nations, reflecting the 
challenges they face in Western democratic countries in terms of perception and regulatory 
constraints, as well as reputation, trust, and cultural barriers. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews the literature and 
presents the hypotheses. Section three describes the data, introduces the PCA and explains the 
methodology. Section four compares conventional and Islamic banks’ financial soundness using the 
components extracted from PCA. It also studies the effect of political systems on the financial 
soundness of Islamic banks. Section five presents the additional estimation techniques. Section six 
discusses the results of this study and compares them with previous studies. The last section 
concludes. 
2. The financial soundness of Islamic banks: The effect of political systems 
The literature offers a sizeable body of research comparing the financial characteristics of 
Islamic banks to those of conventional banks, including Islamic bank stability (Čihák and Hesse, 
2010; Rajhi, 2013; Abedifar et al., 2013; Boumediene and Caby, 2013), efficiency (Beck et al., 2013; 
                                                          
1 Multidimensional measures of bank performance such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) have been extensively used 
in the Islamic banking literature (cf., Sufian, 2007; Viverita et al., 2007; Belans and Hassiki, 2012; Johnes et al., 2014; Saeed 
and Izzeldin, 2014). In this study, we use principal component analysis and extend the analysis by creating several 
dimensional measures that aim to cover all aspects of bank financial soundness such as capital, liquidity, and risk, and not 
only bank performance (e.g. profitability and efficiency).  
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Johnes et al., 2014), and profitability (Bourkhis and Nabi, 2013; Mollah and Zaman, 2015; Farook et 
al., 2015). For instance, Čihák and Hesse (2010) and Abedifar et al. (2013) find no significant 
difference in stability between Islamic and conventional banks, while Rajhi (2013) shows that 
Islamic banks are less stable than their conventional counterparts in MENA countries, but more 
stable than conventional banks in South East Asian (SEA) countries. Furthermore, Boumediene 
and Caby (2013) report that Islamic banks’ stock returns are less volatile than those of conventional 
banks, suggesting that Islamic banks are more stable when using E-GARCH and GJR-GARCH 
estimation techniques. Regarding the business model of Islamic banks, Beck et al. (2013) suggest that 
there are no significant differences between Islamic and conventional banks, except that Islamic banks 
are less cost-efficient and have higher intermediation costs than their conventional peers. Their 
findings contradict Abedifar et al. (2013), who find that Islamic banks do not charge higher rates to 
borrowers, or offer lower rates to depositors, suggesting that there are no differences in terms of 
intermediation costs between Islamic and conventional banks. Johnes et al. (2014) add to the literature 
using efficiency scores. Their findings show that Islamic banks are more efficient than conventional 
banks, but only when each bank type is compared to a separate efficiency frontier. In addition, 
Alqahtani et al. (2014) and Wanke et al. (2016) find that Islamic banks are less cost efficient using the 
cost to income ratio and efficiency scores. Finally, Pappas et al. (2012) and Bourkhis and Nabi (2013) 
use CAMEL ratios to examine the financial soundness of Islamic and conventional banks. The former 
find significant differences in terms of liquidity, leverage, concentration, and failure risk, while the 
latter report no significant differences between the two bank categories. 
While prior studies in the field of Islamic banking have been primarily concerned with 
identifying their risk, efficiency, and profitability profiles and comparing them to those of 
conventional banks, little research has been conducted on whether the political environment has the 
same effect on the financial soundness of the two bank types. This lack of research is, perhaps, 
surprising given the growing importance of political systems in shaping economic policies and in 
affecting financial decisions and economic growth. For example, Faccio (2006) and Li et al. (2008) 
show that the political environment is likely to be more important in emerging markets that are 
characterized by a lack of sound political institutions and the rule of law. These conditions often result 
in unpeaceful transitions, wars, fragile governments and weak and short-term economic policies. In 
line with this, Khafagy (2017) explains that autocratic political systems tend to exhibit opportunistic 
behavior by exploiting their countries’ economic resources and outputs, especially in underdeveloped 
countries. Another example of the importance of political factors is the literature on political 
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connections and bank performance. For instance, Abdelsalam et al. (2017) show that political 
connections negatively affect bank efficiency in the MENA region. According to Nys et al. (2015), 
this negative effect can be explained by the fact that banks have fewer incentives to be efficient 
because they expect that they will be bailed out due to their political connections in case they 
encounter any difficulties.  
This study attempts to address these important issues by extending the analysis to Islamic banks. 
Instead of referring to political connections, we use proxies for a broad range of measures of a 
country’s political and legal systems to investigate their effect on the financial soundness of Islamic 
banks and their conventional counterparts. To the best of our knowledge, the banking literature has 
thus far made no attempt to examine the impact of political systems on the financial soundness of 
Islamic banks. 
That being said, there is some previous research on the related issue of the association between 
religion and the financial soundness of Islamic banks, although the results are inconclusive. For 
instance, Mollah and Zaman (2015) find that Islamic banks are more profitable in Muslim majority 
countries. In contrast, Abedifar et al. (2013) and Mollah et al. (2016) find that Islamic banks are less 
profitable and less stable in Muslim majority countries and Sharia’a based legal systems. In this 
study, we do not use traditional and narrow measures of a country’s religion (e.g. Muslim population, 
the Islamicity index, etc.); rather, we refer to broader and more comprehensive measures of 
democracy and legal systems that consider other implicit factors, such as Muslim culture and identity, 
loyalty and beliefs, traditions and customs. In our initial analysis, we use several proxies for 
democracy to characterize the country’s political system. In a second analysis, we replace these 
variables with proxies for the legal system, meaning whether the country follows Western law, 
Sharia’a law, or a combination of the two. To some extent, the second analysis can be considered as a 
robustness test, as we expect the political and legal systems of a country to be interrelated.  
We expect Islamic banks to be more sensitive than conventional banks to the political / legal 
environment and to fare better in Sharia’a and hybrid legal systems than in Western democratic 
systems. We argue that in Muslim countries, Sharia’a law is more recognized by both governments 
and the general public and thus depositors are more familiar with Islamic banks and the products they 
offer. This should enable Islamic banks to more easily obtain resources in the form of deposits and to 
sell Sharia’a compliant financial products even to non-religious clients. In contrast, Western countries 
may misunderstand Islamic banking practices and link them to extremism, which could damage the 
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reputation and public trust in the industry and thus negatively affect its financial soundness. In 
addition, regulatory authorities in countries that have a Sharia’a based legal system or a hybrid legal 
system are more capable of adapting or developing their regulatory guidelines (e.g. the Islamic 
Financial Services Board regulatory guidelines (IFSB) and the guidelines by the Accounting and 
Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI)) to fit with the specificities of 
Islamic banks. A regulatory framework that acknowledges the specificities of Islamic banks can also 
help reduce the complexity of regulations in countries where both bank types operate and thereby 
avoid the problem of double regulatory standards that Islamic banks often face in Western countries. 
Finally, religious depositors in Muslim majority countries may perceive Islamic banks as the best way 
to preserve Muslim culture and identity. Therefore, a political system that reflects people’s opinions, 
culture, and identity is expected to be more efficient at understanding their needs and thus at 
improving social welfare, alleviating poverty, and promoting a stable and sustainable economic 
growth (Mikaïl, 2012). In the context of our study, this should be reflected by the fit between a given 
bank’s operations with the underlying legal system.2 Accordingly, we pose the following hypotheses: 
H.1: Western, democratic-based political systems have a more detrimental effect on the 
financial soundness of Islamic banks than on the financial soundness of their conventional 
counterparts. 
H.2: Sharia’a based or hybrid legal systems have a more positive effect on the financial 
soundness of Islamic banks than on the financial soundness of their conventional counterparts. 
3. Variables, sample and methodology  
3.1. Choice of main variables  
The conventional banking literature mainly uses one-dimensional accounting or market-based 
measures to examine the financial soundness of banking institutions. For instance, research on bank 
performance often uses return on assets (or equity), cost to income, net interest margin, efficiency 
scores, stock returns, and Tobin’s Q. However, whether these measures can fully capture bank 
performance is questionable (Klomp and de Haan, 2012, 2014; Johnes et al., 2014). This could 
                                                          
2 The Islamic banking industry could potentially improve financial inclusion by increasing the number of bank account 
holders and also the use of financial products that are Sharia’a compliant (GFDR, 2014). Moreover, Mohieldin et al. (2011) 
and Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2013) argue that in Muslim countries, the access to financial services such as formal bank accounts 
is significantly lower than in non-Muslim countries. The ability of Islamic banks to increase financial inclusion of religious 
customers is another reason why we expect Islamic banks to exhibit superior performance in Sharia’a and hybrid legal 
systems.  
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explain why the literature results are not unified on subjects such as banking regulation, stability, 
profitability, and efficiency. In contrast to most previous research, several recent studies perform PCA 
to construct multi-dimensional measures to capture conventional banks’ financial soundness based on 
components of financial ratios. A good example is Canbas et al. (2005) who examine the default 
probability of Turkish commercial banks using PCA for a sample of 40 banks during the period 
between 1994 and 2001. Their results show that capital adequacy, income expenses, and liquidity 
ratios are the most important dimensions in explaining the total variation of internal structures in 
Turkish banks. In line with this, Shih et al. (2007) perform PCA to measure the financial 
intermediation of the Chinese banking sector. The authors show that insolvency risk, liquidity risk, 
credit risk, and profitability represent more than 64% of the total variance in the financial ratios 
employed in the PCA. More recently, Klomp and de Haan (2012) employ PCA with factor analysis 
(FA) to study the impact of banking regulations on bank risk. Using a sample of 200 banks from 
twenty one OECD countries, their results indicate that derived factors and components are strongly 
favored when dealing with multi-faceted concepts such as risk and regulation. Finally, Klomp and de 
Haan (2014) also use PCA and FA to examine the effect of institutional quality on the relationship 
between banking regulations and risk for 370 banks in seventy emerging and developing countries. 
Their findings suggest that capital and liquidity reduce bank risk and that the effect of banking 
regulations depends on the country’s level of institutional quality and development. 
In this study, we extend the concept of using PCA to create a new set of components to 
represent financial soundness (a technique that has so far only been applied to conventional banks), by 
also applying the approach to Islamic banks. One major issue in comparative studies is how to choose 
the correspondent variables. Since the literature shows no general consensus on how to combine 
financial ratios when measuring bank financial soundness, the CAMEL methodology proposes five 
broad indicators: capital adequacy (C), asset quality (A), management quality or efficiency (M), 
earnings and profitability (E), and liquidity (L).3 We argue that since the original criteria used to 
determine which indicators are more deserving of inclusion in the CAMEL ratings are not disclosed to 
the public (Wanke et al., 2016; Jin et al., 2011), proxies are often selected based on what has already 
been used in the literature, taking into consideration data availability. In Table 1, we summarize 29 
                                                          
3 CAMEL methodology also controls for sensitivity to market risk (S). We do not consider this category for two reasons. 
First, market-risk based indicators are extremely rare to find for banks in developing countries, especially for Islamic banks. 
Second, our goal is to use a broad sample of conventional and Islamic banks, rather than only publicly listed banks.        
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financial indicators used to emulate the CAMEL rating in both conventional and Islamic banking 
research studies.4  
INSERT TABLE [1] HERE 
The first group consists of indicators of capital adequacy. Canbas et al. (2005), Shih et al. 
(2007), and Klomp and de Haan (2012) show that capital ratios constitute the most informative 
components when applying PCA. We measure capital adequacy using Tier1 and total capital, all 
scaled by bank risk-weighted-assets, as recommended by the Basel Committee on Banking and 
Supervision (BCBS). We also employ four traditional measures of risk-independent capital ratios: 
Tier 1, total capital, common equity, and tangible equity, all scaled by total assets. We use risk and 
non-risk based capital ratios to avoid any misleading results that could be related to the manipulation 
of weights by banks to hide their real risk exposures (Cathcart et al., 2015; Dermine, 2015).  
The second group consists of measures related to asset quality. We use loan loss reserves, loan 
loss provisions, and impaired loans, all scaled by growth loans, to proxy for asset quality.5  These 
ratios measure loan quality and higher values indicate deterioration in the quality of the credit 
portfolio. In other words, higher values might be explained by a bank’s precautionary reserve policy, 
as well as anticipation of more non-performing loans (Abedifar et al., 2013; Lee and Hsieh, 2013; 
Anginer et al., 2014).  
The third group includes measures of managerial qualities. We proxy managerial quality using 
eight indicators. The first set of indicators includes four accounting ratios: the ratio of bank cost to 
income, the ratio of net interest margin, the ratio of overhead cost to assets, and the ratio of net fees 
and commissions to assets. Klomp and de Haan (2012) and Chortareasa et al. (2012) explain that 
higher expenses may indicate that a bank is not operating efficiently due to managerial deficiencies. 
We also employ four efficiency measures computed using Data Envelopment Analysis (Maghyereh 
and Awartini, 2014). In the first step, we compute a basic gross efficiency6 score model in which we 
                                                          
4 The summary table does not represent a complete survey and should be rather considered as an illustration, not a conclusive 
statement of the ratios used to emulate CAMEL rating and other overlapped financial criteria.  
5 We are aware that the ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans is a backward-looking measure. This is because most of the 
countries in our sample do not have general or dynamic provisioning, which is considered as a forward-looking measure. 
We try to remedy this problem by including loan loss reserves and impaired loans ratios, although the latter is also considered 
as a backward-looking measure, albeit less backward than the first indicator. This point has been brought to our attention 
thankfully by one of the referees.  
6 We refer to gross efficiency when computing efficiency scores relative to a common frontier, which gives an advantage to 
conventional banks as they are more developed than Islamic banks. Therefore, we also follow another approach and compute 
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do not control for the risk in bank inputs and re-calculate our scores by introducing loan loss 
provisions to control for banking risk. In the second step, we compute a basic net efficiency score 
model in which we do not control for the risk in bank inputs and re-calculate our scores by 
introducing loan loss provisions to control for banking risk. In contrast to the first set of indicators, 
higher efficiency scores indicate better risk management, more competent managers, more highly 
skilled employees, and more adequate use of bank resources. 
The fourth group controls for the profitability and earnings of banks. Lower profits may signal a 
decline in successful bank projects, while higher profits can be translated as excessive risk-taking. We 
proxy profitability using the return on average assets and the return on average equity, which are the 
two traditional and most commonly used profitability ratios (Abedifar et al., 2013; Mollah and Zaman, 
2015). As bank earnings can be directly related to risk appetite, we include six measures of the risk 
and volatility of bank returns. We use the log value of bank Z-score (Klomp and de Haan, 2012), the 
risk-adjusted return on average assets, and the risk-adjusted return on average equity, with higher 
values indicating good risk-adjusted profits and more stable banking institutions (Turk-Ariss, 2010a, 
b). We also use the standard deviation of the return on average assets, the standard deviation of the 
return on average equity, and the standard deviation of net interest margin. A higher ratio can be 
interpreted as higher volatility in bank profits and, therefore, a higher risk profile (Houston et al., 
2010; Schaeck and Cihák, 2013).  
The fifth group identifies bank liquidity. The subprime crisis showed that liquidity is equally 
important to bank survival as capital, which required the BCBS to introduce two explicit liquidity 
ratios: the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). We measure 
liquidity with the following indicators: liquid assets to assets; liquid assets to deposits and short-term 
funding; liquid assets to total deposits and borrowing; and net loans to total assets. Except for net 
loans to total assets, the higher these ratios are, the more liquid and less vulnerable the bank will be in 
a situation of stress (Klomp and de Haan, 2012; Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2014). However, it is 
important to note that excessive liquidity might also be explained as a bank’s inefficiency in managing 
its own resources. The net loans to total assets is – in contrast to the first three measures – inversely 
                                                          
net efficiency by estimating our efficiency scores relative to each bank category’s own efficiency frontier to ensure the 
robustness of our results. In other words, Islamic (conventional) banks are compared to their own benchmark (i.e. the most 
efficient Islamic (conventional) banks in a chosen year (Johnes et al., 2014)).  
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related to liquidity. It reflects credit risk exposure, which can negatively affect a bank’s financial 
strength (Turk-Ariss, 2010b; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2011).  
3.2. Sample construction 
To empirically compare the financial soundness of Islamic and conventional banks, we refer to 
Bankscope as a primary source of data collection. For each bank in the sample, we retrieve annual 
data from 1999 to 2013 in 33 countries. Our data are unbalanced and the number of conventional 
(Islamic) banks varies between 377 (44) banks (at the lowest) in 1999 and 590 (139) banks in 2012 (at 
the highest).7 Macroeconomic data such as inflation and GDP growth rates, as well as GDP per capita, 
are obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, whereas political and 
institutional variables are obtained from various sources, such as the Political Regime Characteristics 
and Transitions of Polity IV project, the Political Constraint Dataset, the World Bank’s Database on 
Political Institutions (DPI), and the CIA’s World Fact Book. Table 2 presents the mean, standard 
deviation, minimum, and maximum for both bank types that we initially use before conducting the 
PCA. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the effect of outliers. A bank 
is excluded from the sample if it does not have at least 3 continuous observations. We perform a 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test (Wilc) and the univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) test for the 
equality of means for each financial ratio. In Table 2, financial ratios are presented in ascending order, 
according to the significance level of F-statistics. Both tests suggest that almost all the financial ratios 
are able to split the banks between Islamic and conventional, thus providing empirical evidence that 
financial ratios have a discriminating ability and as a result can be used in the PCA (Canbas et al., 
2005). The equality of both bank types’ means cannot be rejected at 1% for 25 ratios out of 29 ratios 
(as suggested by the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) and at 5% for 23 out of 29 ratios (as suggested by 
the F-test).  
INSERT TABLE [2] HERE 
                                                          
7 The number of reported observations varies dramatically between risk-based capital measures and non-risk-based capital 
measures. For instance, Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets (Tier 1/rwa) has 2,939 (753) observations for conventional 
(Islamic) banks, while non-risk-based measures, such as common equity to assets and tangible equity to assets, have more 
than twice as many observations. (The two ratios have a total of 7,024 (1,375) observations for conventional (Islamic) banks). 
Bitar et al. (2016) argue that the missing observations can be explained either by the fact that most countries started reporting 
their capital requirements information in 2006 or by the fact that some banks prefer not to give information about their 
capital adequacy ratios and would rather provide information about their traditional capital ratios. These countries might 
still be working under the Basel I accord or might prefer not to disclose information about their risk weighting and thus their 
assets’ risk exposure. 
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3.3. Principal Component Analysis 
We use PCA to minimize the dimensionality of the set of financial soundness variables by 
creating a new platform of optimal components that correspond to the most important part of the 
necessary information. This procedure allows the identification and feeding of regression models with 
a few components that represent most of the information initially introduced by the variables. 
According to Canbas et al. (2005), PCA is a procedure for understanding different patterns in data, 
whereby correlated variables – used to proxy financial soundness – are examined to determine the 
most valuable indicators in reporting changes in banking institutions’ financial position. Thus, using 
this technique reduces the initial data set and channels a complex array of correlated variables into a 
small number of uncorrelated variables or factors called components. Before proceeding with the 
PCA, several tests are performed to evaluate the validity of such a technique for our analysis (Canbas 
et al., 2005).   
INSERT TABLE [3] HERE 
First, Table 3 reports the correlation matrix of 29 financial ratios to capture any potential 
subgroups of highly correlated variables. The correlation between each category of financial ratios is 
clear. The literature shows that each category of CAMEL indicators can be measured by a variety of 
financial ratios. These ratios are highly correlated, which provides support for continuing with the 
PCA. Second, Table 4 presents the Bartlett’s test of sphericity to evaluate the appropriateness of 
applying PCA to the financial ratios. This test identifies whether the diagonal elements of the 
correlation matrix are equal to one while the rest of the elements are equal to zero, which would 
indicate that no correlation exists between the ratios. The value of the Chi-square is very high and the 
observed significance is very small (<0.01 significance level). Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis 
that the correlation matrix is an identity matrix. Third, all the financial ratios are standardized with a 
mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. In our PCA study, we use 29 variables; the standardized 
variance is 1 and the total variance is 29. Fourth, we apply certain criteria (described in the following 
paragraph) to decide on the number of components to be retained. Finally, we use a Varimax factor 
rotation to ameliorate the interpretability of the retained components by maximizing the sum of the 
squared correlations between variables and factors. In other words, Varimax rotation helps identify 
variables and reduces the number of indicators that have a relatively high loading on a single 
component. 
INSERT TABLE [4] HERE 
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The choice of latent variables depends on the eigenvalues and the percentage of total variance. 
Although there is no optimal criterion for deciding the number of components to retain when 
performing PCA, Canbas et al. (2005), Shih et al. (2007) and Klomp and de Haan (2012) refer to the 
Kaiser criterion and choose components with eigenvalues >1 to be included in the analysis. An 
alternative method is to look at the Cattell scree plot, which provides a graph in which the eigenvalues 
are plotted on the vertical axis and the components on the horizontal axis. Klomp and de Haan (2012) 
explain that “this test suggests selecting the number of factors that corresponds to the point after 
which the remaining factors decline in approximately a linear fashion, and to retain only the factors 
above the elbow” (pg.3199). The eigenvalues presented in Table 5 and the Cattell scree plot in Fig. 1 
indicate that bank financial soundness can be evaluated using seven components. These components 
explain 78.02% of total variance in the financial soundness of conventional and Islamic banks. To 
assess the appropriateness of applying PCA to the data, we examine the Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO) 
measure of sampling adequacy for the overall data set as well as each individual variable’s measure of 
sampling adequacy (MSA).   
INSERT TABLE [5] HERE 
The results for the seven principal components are presented in Table 6. We find an overall 
KMO of 0.713, greater than 0.7, which indicates that it is appropriate to continue with PCA. Table 6 
also reports the loadings for components (1) to (7), respectively. The first component, C1, reflects 
bank capital, by combining all capital ratios (𝑟1 to 𝑟6), and represents 20.84% of the total variance of 
the financial indicators. The second component, C2, depicts bank efficiency. It consists of four 
efficiency scores (𝑟14 to 𝑟17) and represents 19.13% of the total variance of the financial measures. 
The third component, C3, reports the banking system volatility of returns. It represents 12.49% of the 
total variance of the financial ratios and combines five measures of financial stability and adjusted 
returns (𝑟20 to 𝑟24). However, in contrast to C1 and C2, C3 also loads a negative association with two 
measures of earning volatility. Therefore, it reflects a trade-off between highly stable banks versus 
banks with highly volatile earnings. The fourth component, C4, explores the overall banking liquidity. 
It represents 9.05% of the total variance of the CAMEL indicators and combines four liquidity 
indicators (𝑟26 to 𝑟29). This component also shows an inverse association with credit risk and 
represents a trade-off between two strategies: highly liquid versus low liquidity banks. Therefore, C4 
compares prudent liquid banks with riskier banks that have a higher loan engagement and, as a result, 
a lower liquidity position. Finally, C5, C6, and C7 denote bank financing rates for offering Sharia’a 
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products, profitability, and credit risk, respectively. The three components represent in total 16.53% of 
the total variance of the 29 financial indicators initially introduced.  
INSERT TABLE [6] HERE 
3.4. Econometric specification and control variables 
We refer to Ghosh (2016) and adopt a difference-in-difference research design, using 
components extracted from PCA, to assess the differential effect of various politico-legal systems on 
the financial soundness of Islamic versus conventional banks. We also refer to Abedifar et al. (2013), 
Mollah and Zaman (2015), and Mollah et al. (2016) and use random-effect GLS regressions. We 
prefer the GLS technique to other estimation techniques for two reasons. First, regression models, 
such as OLS, ignore the panel structure of our data. Second, our Islamic bank dummy is time-
invariant and cannot be estimated using a fixed-effect methodology. Accordingly, we employ the 
following regression model: 
CAMEL_PCAijt = α + β1 × Islamici + β2 × Political_Systemsjt + β3 × Political_Systemsjt × Islamici + 
+β4 × Bank_Controlijt + β5 × Country_Controljt  + ∑ βt × YFEt
T
t=1
+ ε    (1) 
where CAMEL_PCAijt are the bank financial characteristics extracted from the PCA (capital, efficiency, 
volatility of returns, liquidity, financing rates for offering Sharia’a products, profitability, and credit 
risk), based on CAMEL indicators for bank i in country j at time t. Islamici is a dummy taking the 
value of one for Islamic banks and zero otherwise. Political_Systemsjt consists of several proxies to 
represent the political environment. We collect data on democracy from the Political Regime 
Characteristics and Transitions of Polity IV project. A democratic political system is mainly 
characterized by freedom of expression, where all citizens have the right to express their opinion and 
choose their leaders. Djankov et al. (2003) explain that the symbol of modern democracy is the 
presence of a private and competitive media, which is considered to be “the fourth estate” along with 
the executive, the legislature, and the courts. From the same database, we also use a polity index 
computed as the difference between democracy and autocracy8 scores, with higher values indicating a 
more democratic system. To check the robustness of our results, we consider two alternative measures 
                                                          
8 A modern autocratic political system is characterized by a high degree of restriction or suppression of other political parties. 
It also exercises a high degree of control over social and economic activities. 
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of the political environment: (i) the POLCON index of political constraints, to measure the degree of 
institutional constraints on the executive branch of the government (Boubakri and Saffar, 2016; 
Klomp and de Haan, 2016); and (ii) the CHECKS index of the World Bank’s Database of Political 
Institutions (DPI), to capture potential obstacles to policy change (Bove et al., 2016). For both 
measures, higher scores indicate that a country is more democratic. The interaction term between 
“Islamic” and “political systems” investigates whether a democratic-based political system has a 
negative effect on the financial soundness of Islamic banks, as expected by H.1. Bank_Controlijt 
includes bank control variables suggested by previous studies. We use the natural logarithm of total 
assets to control for bank size. We also use bank growth to control for development strategies in bank 
total assets in the current year, compared with the previous year (Abedifar et al., 2013). Demirgüç-
Kunt and Huizinga (2010) and Baele et al. (2007) find that greater reliance on non-interest income is 
associated with more volatile returns. Stiroh (2004) finds a negative association between total bank 
risk and diversification of revenues. Thus, we check for diversification using the income diversity 
ratio to capture the degree to which banks diversify between lending and non-lending activities. We 
follow Laeven and Levine (2007) and compute income diversity as 1–[(net interest income–other 
operating income)/(operating income)]. Country_Controlijt controls for macroeconomic variables. 
Accordingly, we use the inflation rate, because banks in countries with higher inflation rates tend to 
charge customers more, resulting in higher bank profits (Lee and Hsieh, 2013). However, such 
behavior might be followed by less demand for loans and more expensive loan reimbursement, 
leading to higher default rates (Koopman, 2009). Chortareasa et al. (2012) consider inflation as a 
signal of an undeveloped market and banking system. Next, we include the GDP growth rate and the 
natural logarithm of GDP per capita to control for the size and development of economic activity in 
each country. YFE𝑡 are the year fixed effects and ε is a white-noise error term. We follow Beck et al. 
(2013) and Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt (2014) and cluster at the bank level, instead of the country 
level, for two reasons. First, our sample includes some countries that have a much larger number of 
observations than others. Second, we have 33 countries. Therefore, clustering at the country level 
might create biased results.  
4. Political systems and the financial soundness of Islamic banks  
4.1. Main findings  
Table 7 Panel A presents the findings of Eq. (1). The baseline regression only compares the 
financial soundness of the two bank types using components extracted from PCA and thus does not 
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include political systems. For each of the extracted components, we use two specifications - before 
and after controlling for macroeconomic variables. The Wald Chi2 tests are highly significant for all 
models, and the R-squares are relatively high and similar to previous literature (Abedifar et al., 2013; 
Mollah and Zaman, 2015; Mollah et al. 2016), suggesting that the models are representative and fit 
with the decision to use GLS, random-effect regression. We find that Islamic banks have lower credit 
risk and are more efficient, more profitable, and more capitalized than their conventional counterparts, 
but their returns are more volatile (less stable). The results hold after controlling for macroeconomic 
conditions but with lower statistical significance for the credit risk component and no statistical 
significance for either the capital or the volatility component. As for the bank control variables, we 
find that larger banks are more efficient, more profitable, charge lower rates on their financial 
products, and have lower credit risk. We also find that larger banks are less capitalized, less liquid, 
and have less volatile returns. The growth rate of gross loans increases bank efficiency and 
profitability, reduces credit risk and liquidity, and makes bank profits less volatile. The diversification 
of bank income improves efficiency and liquidity but makes bank returns more volatile. With regards 
to the macroeconomic indicators, we find that banks in countries with higher GDP growth and GDP 
per capita are more capitalized, more efficient, have lower credit risk, and less volatile returns. 
Finally, we find that higher inflation rates increase bank volatility of returns.   
While the conventional banking literature suggests that a country’s political environment is an 
important determinant of financial and economic growth (Faccio, 2006; Li et al., 2008; Nys et al., 
2015; Abdelsalam et al., 2017; Khafagy,2017), there is no empirical evidence concerning the 
influence of political factors on the financial soundness of Islamic banks. In this study, we focus on 
political systems by comparing the impact of a set of political environment proxies on the financial 
soundness of conventional and Islamic banks. We use Eq. (1), but this time we include political 
systems to represent the political environment. Our results are presented in Table 7, Panels B.1 to B.4, 
and suggest several new insights. First, we find that in a democratic political system, Islamic banks 
are less capitalized, less efficient, and less liquid but have less volatile earnings than conventional 
banks, thus lending support to hypothesis H.1. Islamic banks operating under democratic regimes are 
often exposed to two regulatory standards. They not only need to comply with international 
regulations such as the Basel Accords, but also with the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) and 
the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) regulatory 
frameworks, which could increase the costs of their compliance at the expense of their efficiency 
scores. The results also indicate that Islamic banks are undercapitalized and less liquid in 
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democratically-based political systems. Again, adherence to multiple regulatory frameworks can make 
holding or raising equity more complicated for Islamic banks. In addition, while Islamic banks can 
often benefit from oil revenues9 to increase their deposits and capital ratios, this is not the case for 
most democratic countries in our sample, such as the UK, Singapore, and South Africa, who are not 
oil producing nations. Another explanation for holding lower capital ratios could be the fact that 
democratic countries are often considered more stable than countries with other political systems. 
Therefore, Islamic banks in these countries are less exposed to political instability and thus do not 
need to hold such high capital buffers. As for liquidity, the negative effect of democratic political 
systems reflects the liquidity challenge that Islamic banks face in several countries. Specifically, the 
tendency to hold long-term, less liquid assets rather than to develop new, short-term, liquid asset 
instruments could explain the results. For instance, Islamic banks in GCC countries have the resources 
to develop new, short-term liquidity instruments. In addition, most GCC countries have either a 
hybrid or a Sharia’a based legal system, which could also play an important role in encouraging the 
development of these tools compared to democratic countries. It is also interesting to consider the 
specific example of Malaysia, where the government has invested heavily in developing an Islamic 
financial infrastructure. In contrast to Islamic banks operating in Western democratic countries, 
Islamic banks in Malaysia can benefit from an Islamic interbank money market to facilitate access to 
short-term funding. While Islamic banks are not allowed to channel their liquidity surplus to 
conventional banks or to refinance from Central Banks as lenders of last resort, the existence of a 
Sharia’a compliant Islamic interbank money market allows Islamic banks that have a liquidity surplus 
to channel funds to banks that have liquidity shortages, thereby securing the liquidity mechanism 
necessary to promote the stability of the banking system. 
A further reason as to why we might expect an interaction between a country’s political system 
and the type of bank is that a country’s politics often dictate whether the country follows a Western, 
hybrid, or Sharia’a-based legal system. For instance, in democratic Westernized nations such as the 
UK, Singapore, or South Africa, conventional banks have more privileges than Islamic banks, not 
only in terms of accessing the financial markets and benefiting from government help in periods of 
financial distress, but also with regard to attracting customers, as they can offer a large set of 
competitive financial products (compared to the unfamiliar and smaller set of Islamic financial 
products that are Sharia’a compliant). In addition, Western countries might misunderstand Islamic 
                                                          
9 In oil rich countries, Islamic banks should be able to more easily attract competent and well-trained managers, which may 
further explain their better financial performance when compared to Islamic banks in Western democratic nations. 
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banking practices and link them to extremism, especially after the Arab Spring and the wave of 
terrorist attacks that have targeted many Western countries. This could damage the reputation and 
public trust in the Islamic banking industry and may even result in it being boycotted or constrained, 
which could affect the financial soundness of this industry. To further investigate this point of view, 
we consider the national legal system (i.e., the extent to which a country applies Sharia’a principles) 
and examine its effect on the financial soundness of Islamic banks. Given that political and legal 
systems are closely interrelated, to some extent, this investigation acts as a robustness test of the 
results presented above on the effects of the political system. To do this, we replace Political_Systemsjt 
with three interconnected dummy variables. The first dummy, Western legal system, takes on a value 
of one if a country does not apply Sharia’a rules in its legal system and zero otherwise. The second 
dummy, hybrid legal system, takes on a value of one if Sharia’a law operates alongside another legal 
system (such as English or French law), and zero otherwise. The third dummy, Sharia’a legal system, 
takes on a value of one if Sharia’a is the only accepted law and zero otherwise. For instance, some 
countries, such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan have adopted the vision of a fully Sharia’a compliant 
regime, whereas countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Turkey allow both legal systems to co-exist.10 
INSERT TABLE [7] HERE 
Table 7 Panel B.5 reports the results for the effect of national legal systems on the financial 
soundness of Islamic banks. In contrast to our previous findings in democratic political systems, in 
countries that apply Sharia’a law, Islamic banks are more capitalized, more efficient, and have more 
volatile earnings than conventional banks, suggesting that Islamic banks can access more facilities 
than their conventional counterparts when working under Sharia’a law. We also find that Islamic 
banks charge higher rates for offering Sharia’a products, are more profitable, and have lower credit 
risk than their conventional counterparts. A major distinction between conventional and Islamic banks 
is that the latter’s resources are mainly channeled to finance the purchase of tangible assets, reflecting 
a strong association with the real economy. According to Pappas et al. (2012), the involvement of 
Islamic banks in major governmental infrastructure projects offers a safer income stream and a higher 
ROA than that of conventional banks. For instance, a Standard and Poor’s (2014) report states that the 
balance sheets of Qatar’s Islamic banks are expected to reach $100 billion by 2017 compared with 
only $54 billion in 2012. This rapid growth is due to the engagement of Islamic banks in a large 
number of Qatar’s governmental infrastructure projects. In addition, Islamic bank financed projects 
                                                          
10 As we interact the Islamic bank dummy with the three legal system dummies, we drop the Islamic bank dummy itself.  
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have to be asset-backed, which could also reduce credit risk, although their direct involvement in the 
real economy could also make them vulnerable to financial crises that affect the real economy. 
Furthermore, their direct involvement could make them more exposed to the externalities of political 
conflicts. For instance, Herrala and Turk-Ariss (2016) argue that Islamic banks in countries 
undergoing political conflict might decide to tighten their financing decisions and follow a policy of 
“wait and see”. We obtain similar results in countries with hybrid legal systems, except that Islamic 
banks now charge lower rates for offering Sharia’a products, indicating that they use this strategy to 
compete with the equivalent financial products offered by their conventional counterparts.  
As expected, our findings confirm hypothesis H.2 in demonstrating that Sharia’a and hybrid 
based legal systems are more beneficial to Islamic banks than to their conventional counterparts. We 
further demonstrate that Islamic banks outperform their conventional counterparts in Sharia’a and 
hybrid based legal systems. In addition, Islamic banks operating in Western legal systems are less 
capitalized and less liquid than their conventional counterparts. This is the opposite to what is 
observed for banks operating in Sharia’a based systems. Our results also report that Islamic banks 
have lower credit risk than conventional banks in Western countries, which could explain the lower 
capitalization position of Islamic banks in these countries. Taken together, these observations confirm 
that Western systems have a more detrimental effect on the financial soundness of Islamic banks than 
on the financial soundness of their conventional counterparts (hypothesis H.1).  
To summarize, we find that Islamic banks underperform their conventional counterparts in 
Western and democratic political systems, but that they show superior financial soundness in 
Sharia’a-based and hybrid legal systems. Our findings can be interpreted in several ways. First, 
Islamic banks operating in hybrid and Sharia’a-based legal systems are more recognized by the 
respective governments and the general public. In Muslim majority countries such as Malaysia, Saudi 
Arabia, and Iran, Islamic banks are older and more experienced and thus may be perceived as more 
reputable. In addition, in these countries, customers are more familiar with their products. This would 
enable Islamic banks to easily access the market, obtain resources, and sell Sharia’a compliant 
financial products, in contrast to Western countries where these banks are relatively new and their 
products and practices are unfamiliar and may be misunderstood by customers. Second, while Islamic 
banks in hybrid and Sharia’a based legal systems apply the IFSB/AAOIFI regulatory standard, they 
also have to comply with Basel regulatory guidelines when operating in Western countries, and thus 
are exposed to double regulatory standards. In addition, Islamic banks in Western countries lack a 
developed financial infrastructure such as the Islamic interbank money market. Finally, religious 
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depositors in Muslim majority countries may perceive Islamic banks as the best way to preserve 
Muslim culture and identity, which should improve their financial inclusion. The association between 
financial inclusion and Islamic banks’ financial soundness in countries that apply a hybrid or a 
Sharia’a based legal systems is particularly important. By satisfying other implicit factors, such as 
Muslim culture and identity, loyalty and beliefs, and the application of Sharia’a principles, Islamic 
banks can play a significant role in improving the reputation, confidence, public trust in the financial 
system and thus improve the financial inclusion in Muslim countries, compared to their conventional 
counterparts. 
4.2.Robustness checks  
Given that the main focus of this paper is to investigate the effect of political systems on the 
financial soundness of Islamic banks, in this section, we provide new insights and examine the 
heterogeneity of Islamic banks’ financial soundness, after controlling for the GCC region, the Arab 
Spring, bank age, economic cycles, market discipline and countries’ risk ratings.  
4.2.1. Controlling for GCC region and the Arab Spring  
In this subsection, we explore whether our results are driven by Islamic banks in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.11 We choose to focus on the GCC countries for several 
reasons. First, in 2012, the GCC countries accounted for some 66.2% of Islamic banking assets 
worldwide (Ernst and Young, 2015; Alqahtani et al., 2016). Second, for the period that followed the 
financial crisis, Islamic banks in GCC countries witnessed an 11% growth in assets compared to only 
6.8% for conventional banks operating in the same market (Union of Arab Banks12). Third, political 
systems that govern the GCC countries are different from those that govern the rest of the countries in 
our sample (Bitar et al., 2016). Finally, the GCC countries contributed 24% of the world’s total crude 
oil production in 2013.13 Providing a stable and soundly based political environment plays an 
important role in securing oil exportation and is thus important for the economic and financial 
development of these countries and the world as a whole. Moreover, because of their reliance on the 
                                                          
11 GCC countries include: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. We exclude Oman 
because it only hosts one newly born Islamic bank that has two observations for the entire time period. To represent GCC 
countries, we use a dummy variable that equals one for each of the GCC countries and zero otherwise.    
12 Recent global developments of Islamic banking and finance available at: 
 http://www.uabonline.org/en/research/financial/recentglobaldevelopmentsofislamicbanking/7471/0, accessed 23 August 
2016.  
13 See the 2014 British Petroleum (BP) Statistical Review of World Energy report available at: 
http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/about-bp/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html, accessed 23 
August, 2016. 
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real economy and their location in oil exporting countries, Islamic banks can benefit from oil revenues 
as a way to generate deposits and channel them to investments in large governmental and 
infrastructure projects. Therefore, we control for GCC countries and also introduce a measure of 
political distress, i.e. major protests14, to control for the Arab Spring. To take account of these 
variables, we use Eq. (2) as follows: 
CAMEL_PCAijt = α + β1 × Islamici + β2 × GCCj + β3 × GCCj × Islamici + β4 × Major_Protestsjt 
+β5 × Major_Protestsjt × Islamici + β6 × Bank_Controlijt + β7 × Country_Controljt 
+ ∑ βt × YFEt
T
t=1
+ ε   (2) 
The results presented in Table 8 Panel A suggest the following: (i) banks in GCC countries are 
more capitalized, more efficient, more profitable, less liquid, charge less rent on their financial 
products, and have higher credit risk than banks in other countries; (ii) in contrast to Alqahtani et al. 
(2016), there is no significant difference between Islamic and conventional banks in the GCC region 
in terms of capital, efficiency, and rent charged on financial products. In addition, we find marginal 
evidence that Islamic banks in the GCC countries are more liquid but slightly less profitable and have 
higher credit risk than their conventional counterparts, thus contradicting the results of Alqahtani et al. 
(2016) and Mollah et al. (2016) regarding profitability and credit risk; and (iii) banks are less efficient 
and have higher credit risk in periods of political distress. Moreover, we find that Islamic banks’ 
profitability is more negatively affected by the Arab Spring than conventional banks’ profitability, 
although this finding is only significant at the 10% level.  
Conventional and Islamic banks in the GCC countries appear to be highly capitalized (compared 
to banks in other countries), suggesting that the favorable economic conditions in these countries, 
such as oil revenues, have the same positive effect on both bank types. As for the efficiency and 
profitability of banks in GCC countries, Bitar et al. (2016) suggest that the oil revenues, the rapid 
economic development through the private sector and bank lending, the opening up to foreign 
competition, and the newly adopted financial reforms put pressure on both bank types. Under such 
circumstances, banks may offer new and innovative financial products and spend more on research 
and development, as well as on employee training, to ensure efficiency in allocating resources and to 
                                                          
14 Major protests is a dummy variable that equals one if a country is severely affected by the Arab Spring and zero otherwise.  
For more details about the Arab Spring, refer to Bitar et al. (2016) and Ghosh (2016).  
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enhance productivity. This could ultimately explain why the differential effect of operating in a GCC 
country on the profitability of Islamic banks (compared to conventional banks) barely reaches 
significance. We also find that Islamic banks have higher credit risk than their conventional 
counterparts in the GCC countries, which could also explain their highly capitalized position in these 
countries. Finally, we find a positive differential effect of operating in a GCC country on the liquidity 
of Islamic vs. conventional banks. Different arguments could explain the results. Perhaps Islamic 
banks in the GCC region are more prudent in their investment choices, especially because they cannot 
channel liquidity surplus to conventional banks and cannot benefit from central banks as lenders of 
last resort. In addition, each Islamic bank in the GCC countries has a different Sharia’a board, 
demonstrating differences of scholars’ opinions, which in turn may lead to inconsistencies in their 
decisions. For instance, an Islamic liquidity instrument might be Sharia’a compliant according to one 
Sharia’a board but not another, which makes the development of liquidity instruments more complex 
and difficult to achieve (Hasan, 2010; Laldin et al., 2012). Finally, the higher liquidity of Islamic 
banks (relative to conventional banks) could also explain their lower profitability position. The 
necessity for Islamic banks to maintain higher cash reserves with a zero-return policy has a 
detrimental effect on their profitability because of the opportunity cost that arises from having non-
earning assets on the banks’ balance sheets. 
INSERT TABLE [8] HERE 
4.2.2. Bank age and economic cycle 
A compelling reason for observing variations in the differences between Islamic and 
conventional banks’ financial soundness might be related to bank age. Abedifar et al. (2013) use bank 
age as a proxy for bank experience. Older banks are more experienced and benefit from a large 
network of branches nationally and abroad. In addition, mature banks are likely to have long-term 
relationships with their clients and can thus benefit from information advantages. In contrast, young 
banks, as new players in markets, are considered less experienced and are often constrained by more 
stringent regulation and supervision and, thus, prefer to act more prudently compared to middle-aged 
and mature banks. Therefore, we proxy for bank age using three dummy variables. Banks less than ten 
years old are categorized as young banks, and those that have been operating for a period ranging 
between ten and 20 years are considered middle-aged banks. Finally, banks that have been operating 
for more than 20 years are considered mature banks. We use Eq. (3) and interact the Islamic bank 
dummy with the age dummies. Since we interact the Islamic bank dummy with all three age dummies, 
we drop the Islamic bank dummy itself. 
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CAMEL_PCAijt = α + ∑ 𝛽1 × IBDV𝑖 × AGE/CYCLE
𝑁
AGE/CYCLE=1
+ β2 × Bank_Controlijt + β3
× Country_Controljt + ∑ βt × YFEt
T
t=1
+ ε        (3) 
The results in Table 8 Panel B show important differences between Islamic and conventional 
banks. We find that young Islamic banks have more volatile earnings and lower credit risk than their 
conventional counterparts. We also find that middle-aged Islamic banks are less liquid and have lower 
credit risk. In addition, we find that mature Islamic banks are more efficient, more profitable, but less 
liquid than conventional banks. Finally, we find several significant differences between mature and 
young Islamic banks. Specifically, in contrast to Beck et al. (2013), mature Islamic banks are more 
efficient and more profitable than young Islamic banks, indicating that mature Islamic banks are more 
cost efficient and more capable of exploiting scale economies and activity diversification. Mature 
Islamic banks are also less liquid than young Islamic banks. In contrast to our findings regarding the 
effects of operating in a GCC country, we propose that age and experience cause Islamic banks to be 
less prudent in their investment choices and to prefer to hold fewer cash reserves of zero return, which 
could explain their higher profitability and efficiency position. Furthermore, because mature Islamic 
banks are more experienced and reputable, regulators are more flexible with them in terms of 
developing and structuring new Sharia’a compliant liquidity instruments. In addition, mature Islamic 
banks have more resources to spend on research and development, and thus to develop new liquidity 
instruments, and are better prepared to deal with any liquidity shortages.   
Finally, we also control for the fluctuation of the economy between periods of growth and 
financial distress and examine whether Islamic banks react in the same way during different periods of 
an economic cycle. Because our sample includes the subprime crisis period, Table 8 Panel C 
compares the financial soundness of Islamic and conventional banks for the periods before (1999–
2006), during (2007–2009), and after (2010–2013) the subprime crisis. To do this, we use Eq. (3) and 
interact the Islamic bank dummy with three dummies that represent the periods before, during, and 
after the subprime crisis. 
We find that Islamic banks are more capitalized, more efficient, and more profitable, but have 
more volatile earnings for the period before the financial crisis than conventional banks. During the 
crisis, Islamic banks are also found to be more profitable, with more volatile earnings, but are no 
longer more efficient than their conventional peers. In addition, we find that Islamic banks have lower 
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credit risk than their conventional counterparts. After the crisis, both bank types show similarities in 
terms of capitalization, earnings volatility, liquidity, higher rates, and profitability. They differ, 
however, in terms of efficiency, where Islamic banks are once again more efficient than conventional 
banks.  
4.2.3. Publicly traded banks and countries’ risk ratings  
So far, we have shown important differences between Islamic and conventional financial 
characteristics. These differences depend on several factors such as political environment, legal 
systems, bank age, and economic cycles. Aside from these factors, the financial soundness of Islamic 
banks can also depend on market discipline and dispersion of ownership. Therefore, we examine the 
impact of market discipline and the dispersion of ownership on the financial soundness of Islamic 
banks. Firstly, we use bank listing as a measure for bank market discipline. Indeed, listing a bank on 
the market implies more stringent rules and stricter capital regulation and supervision; thus, less risky 
behavior. Nevertheless, listed equity is likely to be more liquid than unlisted equity and, thus, can be 
easily raised at a lower cost. This means that listed banks can have greater opportunities to grow 
rapidly and benefit from financial instruments to take on more risk than unlisted banks. Secondly, 
listing a bank on the market can be used as a proxy for ownership dispersion. On one side, incentive 
problems arising from the separation of ownership and control become more significant when 
ownership is more dispersed, which might increase bank costs and reduce profits. On the other side, 
being publicly traded means that the bank is likely to be positively affected by market discipline, 
suggesting higher profits and lower costs.  
To do this, we use two interconnected dummy variables. The first dummy, publicly traded, takes 
on a value of one if a bank is listed on a stock exchange and zero otherwise. The second dummy, 
unlisted, takes on a value of one if a bank is not listed on a stock exchange and zero otherwise. We 
interact the Islamic bank dummy with both dummies to investigate whether the differences between 
Islamic and conventional banks vary between listed and unlisted Islamic banks. As we interact the 
Islamic bank dummy with both listed and unlisted dummies, we drop the Islamic bank dummy itself. 
The results are presented in Table 9, Panel A and show that listed Islamic banks are more capitalized, 
more efficient, and more profitable than conventional banks, while unlisted Islamic banks report only 
lower credit risk than their conventional counterparts. Our results suggest that market discipline 
increases publicly traded Islamic bank capitalization, supervision, and monitoring, thus improving 
bank efficiency and profitability.     
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INSERT TABLE [9] HERE 
As a final test, we examine the impact of a country’s overall risk ratings on the financial 
soundness of Islamic banks using data provided by the Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) finance 
reports published by The Economist. A country’s overall risk is derived from three risk indicators: 
sovereign risk, currency risk, and banking sector risk. We use EIU overall risk because it plays a key 
role in a country’s financial assessment. In addition, EIU risk ratings can be a useful tool to help 
investors, bank managers, and hedge funds in deciding whether it is feasible to enter new emerging or 
rapidly changing markets. The overall risk ratings vary between A and CCC. We choose to compare 
Islamic banks with conventional banks in two types of country: highly ranked countries (i.e., those 
with rating A), which have lower overall risk profiles, and low ranked countries (i.e., those with rating 
C)15, which have a higher risk profile.       
The results in Table 9, Panels B and C, suggest that operating in countries with lower risk 
profiles (e.g. the United Kingdom, Singapore, and Qatar) increases the efficiency, profitability, 
stability and capitalization of Islamic banks to a greater extent than it increases the same financial 
soundness components for conventional banks. However, the results for the effect of operating in a 
high risk country (e.g. Syria, Sudan, etc.) are even more striking. We find that operating there makes 
banks more capitalized, more efficient, more stable, more liquid, more profitable, allows them to 
charge higher rates for Sharia’a products, and reduces their credit risk – particularly so for Islamic 
banks. These results indicate that Islamic banks have more distinguished financial characteristics and 
perform better in less developed countries. This might be due to the weak conventional banking sector 
in these countries, the religious beliefs of Muslim populations (prohibition of both interest and 
financial instruments that rely on speculation, etc.), and the important role that Islamic banks can play 
in promoting financial inclusion (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2013; Imam and Kpodar, 2016) and thus 
economic growth (Gheeraert, 2014). 
5. Additional estimation techniques  
In this section, we verify the robustness of our results using several additional econometric 
specifications and methods of correcting standard errors. To do this, we use propensity score matching 
and difference-in-difference estimation techniques. In addition, we employ an instrumental variable 
                                                          
15 We use rating C instead of rating CCC because we find fewer countries with a CCC rating.   
  
27 
 
(IV) approach, a Heckman estimation, and truncated regressions with different clustering of standard 
errors.  
5.1. Propensity score matching 
In Panel A of Table 10, we examine whether differences in the financial soundness of the two 
bank types are driven by differences in sample size.  Therefore, we use a propensity score matching 
(PSM) technique proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) to neutralize any effects related to 
differences between samples and thereby verify the robustness of our results. PSM consists of 
matching observations of banks based on the probability that they are Islamic ones. The comparison 
between Islamic and conventional banks is then studied on the matched sample. To implement PSM 
we make use of our Islamic bank dummy which takes on a value of one for Islamic banks and 0 
otherwise. We then estimate a logit model where we regress the Islamic bank dummy on all the 
control variables used in the baseline model and the year fixed effects. We use the scores estimated to 
match each observation with a dummy that equals 1 for Islamic banks and 0 for conventional banks. 
Additionally, we employ three different matching methods: K-nearest neighbors with n=2 and n=5; 
Gaussian Kernel matching; and radius matching. In all matched samples (Models (1) to (14) in Table 
10 Panel A), we continue to find evidence that Islamic banks are more capitalized, more efficient, 
more profitable, and have lower credit risk but more volatile earnings than their conventional 
counterparts. The findings also suggest that Islamic banks are less liquid when matched with 
conventional banks with similar financial characteristics.  
INSERT TABLE [10] HERE 
5.2. Difference-in-difference estimation and matching  
The findings in Table 8 suggest that political distress has a negative and marginal differential 
effect on the profitability component of Islamic banks relative to conventional banks while the effect 
is negative but not significant for the credit risk component. These findings are similar to Ghosh 
(2016) for credit risk but different for profitability. Therefore, we examine the robustness of the 
results using a difference-in-difference estimation technique. This technique allows us to compare the 
changes in the financial soundness of Islamic banks due to major protests with the changes in the 
financial soundness of a similar group of conventional banks. To do this, we create two dummy 
variables. Treated is a dummy variable used to identify the group exposed to the “treatment”, which in 
our case are major protests. This dummy equals one for all Islamic banks in the sample (treated group) 
and zero for conventional banks (control group). Post is a dummy variable that equals one in the post-
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treatment period, which in our case is the period when the major protests have taken place. Then, in a 
second step, we interact the Treated and Post dummies to represent the difference-in-difference and 
thus show the actual effect of the introduction of the variable Major Protests. In the difference-in-
difference regression, we also include bank- and country-level control variables and year fixed effects. 
Schepens (2016) argues that to obtain reliable difference-in-difference estimates, a propensity score 
matching technique is needed to construct a control group of conventional banks that have similar 
financial characteristics as those of Islamic ones. Similar to section 6.1, we again employ a Kernel 
matching of propensity scores. We use a logistic model where we regress the Islamic bank dummy on 
all the control variables mentioned above. Finally, we use the predicted probabilities to match Islamic 
banks with their conventional counterparts. The impact of the Kernel difference-in-difference 
estimation is illustrated in Panel B of Table 10. The results confirm our earlier findings and suggest 
that the Arab Spring was more detrimental to the profitability of Islamic banks than to the profitability 
of conventional banks (at the 5% level of significance). The results also suggest that the Arab Spring 
caused a higher increase in the volatility of earnings for Islamic banks than for conventional banks. 
5.3. Other estimation techniques and methods of correcting standard errors  
We now examine the robustness of our results using two alternative econometric specifications 
and methods of correcting standard errors. First, we use truncated regressions to address any bias 
related to the upper and lower distribution of observations for the dependent variable. We also use a 
Newey-West procedure to correct autocorrelation among the residuals. Second, we employ random 
effect regressions and employ a White procedure to correct the heteroscedasticity of the standard 
errors. Table 10, Panel C reports very similar findings to the main results. Islamic banks are more 
efficient, more profitable, have lower credit risk, and more volatile earnings than conventional banks. 
There is also marginal evidence that Islamic banks are more capitalized and less liquid than 
conventional banks.  
5.4.  Addressing endogeneity and selection bias   
We complement our analysis by addressing the issue of endogeneity using an instrumental 
variables (IV) approach. First, the IV approach regresses our Islamic bank dummy variable on the 
instruments (described below) and on the bank-level control variables and the year fixed effects as 
used in the baseline models (Table 7 Panel A). Second, the predicted values of the Islamic dummy 
replace the dummy itself in the baseline models. The current literature on comparing Islamic and 
conventional banks is largely silent about endogeneity and lacks proper instruments to correct for any 
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potential adverse selection problem. In this study, we use three instruments:16 (i) religion, which 
represents the proportion of the population of each country that is Muslim; (ii) experience, which 
takes on the value of one if the bank has been operating for more than 20 years; and (iii) a GCC 
dummy which equals one if banks are located in the GCC regions and zero otherwise.  
We follow Barth et al. (2009) and Bitar et al. (2016) and conduct an F-test of the excluded 
exogenous variables in the first-stage regressions. The null hypothesis of the test is that our 
instruments do not explain cross-sectional differences in capital regulatory guidelines and measures. 
We reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level in all models. The results of the first-stage regressions 
are reported in Table 11, Panel A.1. Model (1) and mainly show that Islamic banks are less 
experienced than conventional banks and are primarily concentrated in the GCC and Muslim 
countries. The results of the second-stage regressions are reported in Table 11, Panel A.1, Models (2) 
to (15). We use two different estimation techniques: a two-stage least squares regression (2SLS) 
(Ashraf et al., 2016); and a generalized method of moments (GMM) (Bitar et al., 2016). The results 
yield very similar findings to the PSM technique. Islamic banks are more capitalized, more efficient, 
more profitable, less liquid, and have lower credit risk and more volatile earnings than their 
conventional counterparts. In Panel A.2, we replace the GCC dummy with a fuel export dummy to 
check the robustness of our instruments. We expect both the GCC dummy and the fuel export dummy 
to have a positive effect on the emergence and development of Islamic banks. We consistently obtain 
the same results, thus reinforcing our earlier findings.    
INSERT TABLE [11] HERE 
Finally, Table 11 Panel B shows the results from a Heckman (1979) selection approach to 
correct for a potential self-selection bias. The main objective of this analysis is to control for the bank 
choice of being Islamic. In the first step, we estimate a probit model that regresses our Islamic bank 
dummy on three instruments as well as on all control variables and year fixed effects. We use the 
same instruments as mentioned above and the control variables and year fixed effect from the baseline 
model. In the second-stage regression, we consider the PCA components as the different dependent 
variables, the Islamic bank dummy as the independent variable, and a self-selection parameter 
(measured as the inverse Mills ratio) estimated from the first-stage regression. Heckman’s (1979) two-
                                                          
16 We are not claiming that these variables are the best possible instruments. However, as we have shown in Tables 7 and 8, 
these instruments display good explanatory power regarding the existence, the development, and the effect of the financial 
characteristics that distinguish between the two bank types.    
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stage self-selection model continues to suggest that Islamic banks are more efficient and have lower 
credit risk than their conventional counterparts, while the rest of the components report insignificant 
results.     
6. Discussion of the results 
The consensus in most empirical studies is that ratio analyses along with panel regressions are 
the best available practice for assessing and comparing the financial soundness of Islamic and 
conventional banks. However, previous research did not justify whether these ratios are capable of 
providing a complete picture of bank financial soundness, especially in comparative studies. For 
instance, Johnes et al. (2014) criticize ratio analyses and use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to 
compare the efficiency scores of conventional and Islamic banks. The recent literature also uses PCA 
to derive new summarized measures that represent the most needed information for comparison 
purposes (Canbas et al., 2005; Shih et al., 2008, Klomp and de Haan, 2012, 2014). In this study, we 
add to the debate and employ PCA to investigate whether summarized components produce the same 
results as those found in the previous literature regarding the stability, efficiency, profitability, and 
credit risk of Islamic and conventional banks. 
The regressions on PCA components provide new insights into the financial soundness of 
Islamic banks. Table 12 reports detailed comparisons of the present results based on PCA versus the 
results of methodologies and ratios used in previous studies.17 For instance, most of the literature finds 
that Islamic banks are significantly more capitalized than conventional banks (Beck et al., 2013; 
Abedifar et al., 2013; Alqahtani et al., 2016). Our results show marginal evidence for the superiority 
of Islamic banks in term of capitalization. In addition, the previous literature tends to concur on the 
superiority of conventional banks’ efficiency (Beck et al., 2013; Alqahtani et al., 2016; Wanke et al., 
2016). Our study reports opposite results and shows that Islamic banks are significantly more efficient 
than conventional banks. Furthermore, the literature shows that conventional banks are more stable 
than Islamic banks, although several studies report no significant difference (Pappas et al., 2012; 
Abedifar et al., 2013; Beck et al., 2013; Boumedienne and Caby, 2013; Bourkis and Nabi, 2013). Our 
study reports opposite results and shows that Islamic banks are less stable and have more volatile 
earnings than conventional banks. We also report different results for the liquidity and the profitability 
                                                          
17 It is worth bearing in mind that differences between the current findings and those of previous studies are likely to arise 
not only due to the different method of analysis (PCA versus single ratios) but also due to other methodological differences, 
such as the time period and specific countries investigated. 
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components. First, the liquidity component suggests that Islamic banks are not significantly different 
from conventional banks, thus contradicting the findings of Alqahtani et al. (2016). Second, Islamic 
banks are significantly more profitable than conventional banks, thus opposing the findings of Mollah 
and Zaman (2015) and Mollah et al. (2016). Nevertheless, the findings also show similarities with the 
previous literature. For example, we find that Islamic banks do not charge higher rates for offering 
Sharia’a compliant products (Abedifar et al., 2013) and that they have lower credit risk than 
conventional banks (Abedifar et al., 2013; Beck et al., 2013; Alqahtani et al., 2016).  
In addition, the conventional banking literature points out that the political environment is an 
important determinant of financial and economic growth (Faccio, 2006; Li et al., 2008; Mahboub and 
Abdou, 2012; Khandelwal and Roitman, 2013; Nys et al., 2015; Abdelsalam et al., 2017; Khafagy, 
2017), whereas prior comparative studies on conventional and Islamic banks lack evidence on 
whether political systems have the same effect on the two bank types. As explained in Section 2, we 
hypothesized that Western democratic political systems are likely to be more detrimental to Islamic 
banks than to conventional banks because in such systems, Islamic banks are relatively new, their 
products are unfamiliar to customers, they face cultural barriers, and experience increased regulatory 
challenges. Our findings reported in Table 7 provide clear evidence of the superiority of Islamic banks 
in terms of capital, efficiency, profitability, and credit risk, when operating in Sharia’a based legal 
systems compared to Western legal systems and more democratic nations, thus providing empirical 
support to hypotheses H.1 and H.2. Table 12 also reports detailed comparison of the results for the 
effect of political systems on the financial soundness of Islamic banks. While the previous literature 
reports no empirical evidence on whether Islamic banks are more capitalized, more efficient, more 
liquid, or charge a higher rent for offering Sharia’a products in democratic nations than in Sharia’a 
based legal systems, it provides some evidence for the effect of religion on stability, profitability and 
credit risk that is worth mentioning. For example, in contrast to Abedifar et al. (2013), we find that 
Islamic banks are more stable in Western and more democratic political systems than in Sharia’a 
based legal systems. We also find that Islamic banks are more profitable in Sharia’a based legal 
systems, thus opposing the findings of Mollah et al. (2016). 
INSERT TABLE [12] HERE 
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7. Conclusions 
In this study, we examine the financial soundness of conventional and Islamic banks using 
components extracted from PCA. We also examine whether a democratic political system and a 
Sharia’a legal system have a different effect on the financial soundness of Islamic banks versus 
conventional banks and the reasons that could explain any differences. To do this, we first create a 
new set of multidimensional measures and find that components of capital, efficiency, volatility of 
returns, liquidity, charging of higher rates for Sharia’a compliant products, profitability, and credit 
risk are the most informative indicators of bank financial soundness. Second, we use random-effect 
GLS regressions and find that Islamic banks underperform their conventional counterparts in Western 
democratic nations but outperform them in countries that employ Sharia’a or hybrid legal systems. 
Finally, a battery of robustness checks including a propensity score matching technique, an 
instrumental variables approach, and a Henchman estimation technique, confirm our results.  
This study has methodological and operational implications for the current stream of research in 
Islamic banking. On a methodological level, our findings suggest that using components extracted 
from PCA to compare the financial soundness of conventional and Islamic banks could lead to 
conflicting results relative to those provided by the previous literature that uses accounting ratios. At 
the operational level, our results reflect the challenges that the Islamic banking industry faces in 
Western countries in terms of perception, regulatory constraints, reputation, trust, and cultural 
barriers. The latter finding is particularly important, as it suggests that other factors captured by a 
country’s political environment, such as Muslim culture and identity, loyalty and beliefs, and the 
application of Sharia’a principles can also play a significant role in improving the reputation, 
confidence, public trust, and thus the financial soundness of Islamic banks. Therefore, in addition to 
studying the political environment, an appropriate avenue for future investigation would be to explore 
the impact of factors such as culture (e.g. Hofstede’s and the Globe’s cultural dimensions, the World 
Values Survey, etc.), the regulatory environment (e.g. capital stringency, supervisory power, 
independent auditors, etc.), and law and order (e.g. the rule of law, creditor rights, information 
sharing, etc.) on the financial soundness of Islamic banks. Finally, it is worth noting that the overall 
interpretation of the results depends largely on the way we understand the components extracted from 
the PCA. In other words, in comparison to simple ratio analyses, PCA suffers from the limitation that 
the intuitive meaning of the components is more difficult to uncover. We attempt to overcome 
potential limitations related to the interpretation of the components by presenting the factor loadings 
and by explaining how ratios are combined whenever we find a negative correlation between a ratio 
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and the rest of the component loadings. Another limitation that can be avoided in future 
investigations, although it would require the use of larger samples, is to account for sensitivity to 
market risk by adding market-risk based indicators along with accounting ratios in the CAMEL 
classification.   
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Tables 
Table 1  
(Sub) criteria used to evaluate bank financial soundness 
 CAMEL ratios used in conventional banking literature    CAMEL ratios used in Islamic banking literature    Other comparative studies  
 Klomp and 
de Haan 
(2015) 
Betz et 
al. 
(2014) 
Maghyereh 
et al. 
(2014) 
Klomp and 
de Haan 
(2012) 
Ötker and 
Podpiera 
(2010) 
 Wanke et 
al. (2016) 
Alqahtani 
et al. 
(2016) 
Bourkhis 
and Nabi 
(2013) 
Rashid and 
Jabeen 
(2016) 
 Olson and 
Zoubi 
(2016) 
Beck et 
al. 
(2013) 
Abedifar 
et al. 
(2013) 
Capital adequacy (C)               
Tier1/risk weighted assets (rwa)  √ √ √ √  (A)        
Total capital/ risk weighted assets (rwa) √  √  √  √ √  √     
Tier1/total assets* (ta)               
Total capital/ total assets* (ta)         √      
Tangible equity/ tangible assets* (taa) tetap Tetap tetap tetap   Tetap tetap  tetap  R   
Common equity/ total assets* (ta) tetap Tetap tetap tetap   Tetap tetap  tetap  R   
               
Asset quality (A)               
Loan loss reserves/growth loans (gl)    /tl √ √  √     R (E) R 
Loan loss provision/growth loans (gl) /tl √ √  /tl √ /tl /tl √ √  √ √     BM R 
Impaired loans/growth loans (gl) /tl √ √  /ta √ /tl /tl √ √  √ √ √    BM R 
               
Managerial quality (M)               
Cost to income ratio √ √  √ √  (E)  √ (E)    (E) (E) 
Net interest margins (NIM)  (E) (E)  (E)  √     (E)    
Overheads cost/total assets (ta) √   √    √  /gi     (E)  
Net fees and commissions/total assets        (L)       
Net efficiency (Net eff)   √            
Net efficiency with risk factor (Net risk)   √            
Growth efficiency (Growth eff)   √            
Growth efficiency with risk factor 
(Growth risk) 
  √            
               
Earnings and profitability (E)               
Return on average assets (ROAAP) √ (A) √ √ √  √ √ √ √  √ S √ 
Return on average equity (ROAE) √ (M) √ √ √  √ √ √ √  √  √ 
Log (Bank Z-score)    √ (C)       R S S 
Adjusted ROAAP              S 
Adjusted ROAE              S 
Volatility of ROAAP*               
Volatility of ROAEP*               
Volatility of NIM*               
               
Liquidity (L)               
Liquid assets/total assets √   √ √  √ √  √     
Liquid assets/ short-term funds √  √ √    √ √    (A)  
Liquid assets/total deposits       √        
Net loans/total assets √ /td  (A) √ /td   √ √ /td (A) √     
Notes: (C), (A), (M), (E), and (L) represent Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Managerial quality, Earnings and profitability, and Liquidity, respectively. R, BM and S represent bank Risk; Business Model and 
Stability employed in the previous Islamic banking literature. We also include some other commonly used variants of ratios: tetap for equity to assets ratio; tl for total loans; ta for total assets; gi for gross income; 
td for total deposit. * refer to ratios used in the broader banking literature such as Houston et al. (2010), Schaeck and Cihák (2013), and Bitar et al. (2016).  
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Table 2  
Descriptive statistics and tests of equality for the financial ratios of conventional and Islamic banks 
Ratios Conventional banks  Islamic banks  Test statistics 
 N Mean SD Min Max  N Mean SD Min Max  𝑊𝑖𝑙𝑐. F Sig. 
Net efficiency 5620 53.38 24.57 0 100  1015 75.3 25.91 15.05 100  -23.07*** 625.02 0.000 
Net efficiency with risk factor 4523 66.84 22.56 0 100  677 86.37 19.85 24.65 100  -20.6*** 548.96 0.000 
Tangible equity/ total assets 7024 13.62 12.38 2.64 79.68  1374 20.96 21.19 3.78 82.42  -10.73*** 160.59 0.000 
Common equity/ total assets 7024 13.71 12.29 2.81 78.95  1375 21.34 21.66 3.77 84.4  -11.03*** 154.66 0.000 
Volatility of NIM 5447 0.65 0.95 0 24.27  1046 1.42 2.16 0 17.64  -16.41*** 127.57 0.000 
Tier1/risk weighted assets 2939 16.81 8.81 7.51 42.25  753 24.31 19.01 7.7 79.8  -9.12*** 111.26 0.000 
Volatility of ROAAP 5528 0.7 1.09 0 14.7  1077 1.5 2.56 0 19.38  -12.26*** 102.53 0.000 
Log (Bank Z-score) 5335 3.6 1.09 1.44 5.63  1031 3.26 1.07 1.08 5.33  9.02*** 87.54 0.000 
Adjusted ROAAP 5335 5.55 6.35 -1 23.55  1031 3.97 4.81 -1.47 17.65  7.08*** 82.94 0.000 
Tier1/total assets 3000 10.88 6.08 3.48 27.15  606 17.65 18.23 3.22 73.86  -6.37*** 81.48 0.000 
Adjusted ROAE 5330 5.73 6.73 -0.7 25.51  1033 4.11 5.05 -1.44 18.64  6.82*** 78.62 0.000 
Liquid assets/total assets 7001 34.01 21.99 1.13 83.43  1372 28.93 19.61 0.33 91.25  7.27*** 73.75 0.000 
Total capital/ risk weighted assets 4130 20.2 10.06 10.05 49.01  858 26.23 20.2 9.43 86  -4.75*** 72.73 0.000 
Total capital/ total assets 3205 12.34 6.33 4.39 29.49  613 18.54 18.43 3.57 75.57  -4.48*** 67.96 0.000 
Overheads cost/total assets 6848 2.89 2.47 0.08 15.86  1369 3.5 3.06 0.57 18.99  -.7.1*** 46.79 0.000 
Cost to income ratio 6716 58.68 31.88 6.86 232.61  1305 68.63 61.9 15.35 475.24  -2.84*** 32.07 0.000 
Loan loss provision/growth loans 6107 1.27 1.6 -0.5 6.01  1008 1.76 2.7 -0.31 11.17  -3.3*** 31.69 0.000 
Liquid assets/ short-term funds 6578 46.48 43.04 2.16 314.97  1285 57.94 79.77 1.46 546.19  -1.1 25.06 0.000 
Volatility of ROAEP 5525 5.84 8.67 0 77.07  1077 7.13 8.53 0.06 77.67  -8.44*** 20.39 0.000 
Growth efficiency with risk factor 4523 62.52 23.83 0 100  677 67 24.87 18.31 100  -4.22*** 19.32 0.000 
Growth efficiency 5620 49.06 25.09 0 100  1015 52.36 27.4 2.36 100  -2.91*** 12.76 0.000 
Impaired loans/growth loans 4526 8.75 9.57 0.48 35.75  555 7.44 9.25 0.34 36.61  4.17*** 9.88 0.000 
Net interest margins (NIM) 6851 3.94 2.86 -1.14 17.33  1344 4.27 4.72 -6.28 28.23  -0.85 6.27 0.012 
Net loans/total assets 6952 48.86 22.61 3.06 88.74  1328 47.78 24.66 0.03 98.86  0.66 2.19 0.139 
Return on average equity (ROAE) 6941 10.1 15.42 -74.73 38.87  1371 9.47 15.76 -53.64 49.62  2.74*** 1.8 0.180 
Liquid assets/total deposits 5561 41.36 23.94 0.27 97.04  670 39.61 38.22 0.32 256.25  6.08*** 1.34 0.247 
Net fees and commissions/total assets 6144 1.09 1.3 -0.07 8.31  1106 1.14 1.77 -0.2 11.71  5.33*** 0.86 0.353 
Return on average assets (ROAAP) 6951 1.12 1.98 -9.22 6.47  1371 1.21 4.17 -17.15 16.67  -1.39 0.59 0.443 
Loan loss reserves/growth loans 5915 6.22 6.36 0.51 24.46  969 6.26 7.21 0.52 28.97  1.05 0.02 0.894 
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Table 3 
Correlation matrix of bank financial soundness indicators 
Notes: This table shows the correlation between 29 CAMEL indicators of bank financial characteristics that are used to construct our measures of bank soundness employed in the empirical analysis  
 
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
Tier1/risk weighted assets (1) 1.00 0.94 0.79 0.65 0.77 0.75 0.11 -0.04 0.07 -0.04 0.26 0.19 0.16 -0.06 0.05 -0.09 0.02 0.27 0.04 
Total capital/ risk weighted assets (2)  1.00 0.71 0.66 0.70 0.69 0.13 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.22 0.20 0.16 -0.03 0.08 -0.04 0.06 0.19 -0.02 
Tier1/total assets (3)   1.00 0.88 0.92 0.92 0.05 -0.01 0.03 -0.13 0.38 0.27 0.24 -0.07 0.03 -0.15 -0.04 0.34 0.07 
Total capital/ total assets (4)    1.00 0.80 0.81 0.05 0.03 0.04 -0.09 0.35 0.28 0.24 -0.06 0.03 -0.13 -0.04 0.27 0.02 
Tangible equity/ total assets (5)     1.00 0.97 0.03 -0.05 0.01 -0.16 0.39 0.25 0.20 -0.09 0.02 -0.18 -0.05 0.37 0.09 
Common equity/ total assets (6)      1.00 0.06 -0.02 0.04 -0.09 0.41 0.31 0.23 -0.11 0.00 -0.18 -0.06 0.34 0.06 
Loan loss reserves/growth loans (7)       1.00 0.52 0.82 0.24 0.04 0.16 -0.01 -0.18 -0.23 -0.13 -0.20 -0.34 -0.31 
Loan loss provision/growth loans (8)        1.00 0.52 0.16 0.13 0.21 0.11 -0.06 -0.26 -0.05 -0.25 -0.44 -0.44 
Impaired loans/growth loans (9)         1.00 0.28 -0.04 0.13 -0.05 -0.17 -0.24 -0.15 -0.22 -0.40 -0.38 
Cost to income ratio (10)          1.00 -0.04 0.46 0.00 -0.29 -0.28 -0.25 -0.24 -0.61 -0.55 
Net interest margins (NIM) (11)           1.00 0.68 0.32 -0.36 -0.31 -0.40 -0.35 0.40 0.32 
Overheads cost/total assets (12)            1.00 0.55 -0.33 -0.28 -0.34 -0.29 0.05 0.03 
Net fees /total assets (13)             1.00 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.32 0.21 
Net efficiency (14)              1.00 0.81 0.89 0.75 0.11 0.08 
Net efficiency with risk factor (15)               1.00 0.73 0.91 0.20 0.15 
Growth efficiency (16)                1.00 0.82 0.06 0.06 
Growth efficiency with risk factor (17)                 1.00 0.16 0.13 
Return on average assets (ROAAP) (18)                  1.00 0.80 
Return on average equity (ROAE) (19)                   1.00 
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Table 3  
Correlation matrix of bank financial soundness indicators – continued   
Notes: This table shows the correlation between 29 CAMEL indicators of bank financial characteristics that are used to construct our measures of bank soundness employed in the empirical analysis  
 
 
Table 4 
Results of Bartlett tests of sphericity 
Bartlett tests of sphericity 
Chi-square 37221.81 
Degrees of freedom 406 
Significance 0.000 
  
           (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) 
Tier1/risk weighted assets (1)          0.15 0.05 0.00 0.27 -0.09 0.17 0.24 0.18 0.20 -0.07 
Total capital/ risk weighted assets (2)          0.11 0.01 -0.03 0.25 -0.05 0.19 0.26 0.24 0.22 -0.07 
Tier1/total assets (3)          0.12 0.02 -0.01 0.26 -0.10 0.23 0.02 0.09 0.09 0.21 
Total capital/ total assets (4)          0.06 -0.01 -0.05 0.25 -0.05 0.24 -0.02 0.10 0.08 0.24 
Tangible equity/ total assets (5)          0.16 0.05 0.02 0.30 -0.15 0.19 0.05 0.09 0.12 0.19 
Common equity/ total assets (6)          0.13 0.02 -0.02 0.32 -0.12 0.22 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.18 
Loan loss reserves/growth loans (7)          -0.21 -0.18 -0.17 0.11 0.26 0.32 0.21 0.13 0.16 -0.27 
Loan loss provision/growth loans (8)          -0.33 -0.29 -0.30 0.14 0.38 0.31 0.12 0.09 0.12 -0.03 
Impaired loans/growth loans (9)          -0.21 -0.24 -0.24 0.07 0.28 0.29 0.18 0.14 0.20 -0.18 
Cost to income ratio (10)          -0.24 -0.31 -0.30 0.20 0.26 0.18 0.11 0.15 0.17 -0.12 
Net interest margins (NIM) (11)          0.03 0.08 0.06 0.41 -0.08 0.10 -0.10 -0.18 0.07 0.40 
Overheads cost/total assets (12)          -0.09 -0.11 -0.10 0.38 0.09 0.22 0.02 0.01 0.23 0.24 
Net fees /total assets (13)          -0.07 -0.03 -0.02 0.15 0.04 0.23 0.07 0.04 0.24 0.19 
Net efficiency (14)          0.04 0.09 0.12 -0.20 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 0.14 -0.02 0.04 
Net efficiency with risk factor (15)          0.09 0.11 0.13 -0.14 -0.07 -0.06 -0.01 0.14 -0.01 0.03 
Growth efficiency (16)          0.06 0.11 0.15 -0.24 0.00 -0.08 0.02 0.17 0.01 -0.02 
Growth efficiency with risk factor (17)          0.09 0.13 0.15 -0.17 -0.05 -0.07 0.02 0.16 0.01 -0.02 
Return on average assets (ROAAP) (18)          0.26 0.33 0.33 0.04 -0.35 -0.15 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 0.14 
Return on average equity (ROAE) (19)          0.31 0.37 0.38 0.01 -0.42 -0.23 -0.08 -0.11 -0.04 0.10 
Log (Bank Z-score) (20)          1.00 0.82 0.65 -0.20 -0.70 -0.69 -0.02 -0.08 -0.06 -0.08 
Adjusted ROAAP (21)           1.00 0.77 -0.19 -0.44 -0.46 -0.04 -0.10 -0.06 -0.02 
Adjusted ROAE (22)            1.00 -0.17 -0.47 -0.41 -0.06 -0.11 -0.07 -0.00 
Volatility of ROAAP (23)             1.00 0.19 0.31 0.05 0.10 0.08 0.07 
Volatility of ROAEP (24)              1.00 0.78 0.05 0.10 0.08 0.02 
Volatility of NIM (25)               1.00 0.05 0.12 0.13 0.07 
Liquid assets/total assets (26)                1.00 0.71 0.68 -0.44 
Liquid assets/ short-term funds (27)                 1.00 0.51 -0.42 
Liquid assets/total deposits (28)                  1.00 -0.05 
Net loans/total assets (29)                   1.00 
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Table 5  
Eigenvalues of the components 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.1. Scree plot of bank financial soundness 
 
Notes: This table reports the eigenvalues of the PCA components. The 
numbers in bold have an eigenvalue above 1, indicating (according to the 
Kaiser criterion) that 7 factors are relevant in capturing bank financial 
soundness: C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C7 represent capital, efficiency, volatility 
of returns, liquidity, charges for offering Sharia’a products, profitability and 
risk, respectively.  
  
Components Eigenvalues Variance % Cumulative % 
𝐶1 6.042 20.84 20.84 
𝐶2 5.548 19.13 39.97 
𝐶3 3.621 12.49 52.45 
𝐶4 2.623 9.05 61.5 
𝐶5 1.948 6.72 68.22 
𝐶6 1.542 5.32 73.54 
𝐶7 1.302 4.49 78.02 
𝐶8 0.926 3.19 81.22 
𝐶9 0.811 2.8 84.02 
𝐶10 0.740 2.55 86.57 
𝐶11 0.635 2.19 88.76 
𝐶12 0.526 1.82 90.57 
𝐶13 0.426 1.47 92.04 
𝐶14 0.314 1.08 93.13 
𝐶15 0.289 1 94.12 
𝐶16 0.262 0.9 95.03 
𝐶17 0.231 0.8 95.82 
𝐶18 0.194 0.67 96.49 
𝐶19 0.173 0.6 97.09 
𝐶20 0.164 0.57 97.66 
𝐶21 0.147 0.51 98.16 
𝐶22 0.130 0.45 98.61 
𝐶23 0.111 0.38 99 
𝐶24 0.085 0.29 99.29 
𝐶25 0.067 0.23 99.52 
𝐶26 0.061 0.21 99.73 
C27 0.030 0.1 99.84 
𝐶28 0.025 0.09 99.92 
𝐶29 0.022 0.08 100 
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Table 6  
The financial soundness of banks: A principal component analysis 
Ratios Definition C1 
Capital 
C2 
Efficiency 
C3 
Volatility 
C4 
Liquidity 
C5 
Charges 
C6 
Profitability 
C7 
Risk 
KMO 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 
 Capital adequacy         
𝑟1 Tier1/risk weighted assets 0.395 -0.001 0.033 0.108 -0.056 -0.012 0.009 0.695 
𝑟2 Total capital/ risk weighted assets 0.383 0.029 0.027 0.122 -0.043 -0.068 0.003 0.700 
𝑟3 Tier1/total assets 0.416 0.007 -0.005 -0.061 0.014 0.024 0.015 0.787 
𝑟4 Total capital/ total assets 0.383 0.023 -0.021 -0.079 0.037 -0.010 0.011 0.788 
𝑟5 Tangible equity/ total assets 0.410 -0.02 0.009 -0.03 -0.002 0.045 -0.003 0.857 
𝑟6 Common equity/ total assets 0.406 -0.016 0.002 -0.029 0.031 0.013 -0.002 0.849 
          
 Asset quality         
𝑟7 Loan loss reserves/growth loans 0.015 -0.019 0.025 0.031 -0.016 0.033 0.598 0.694 
𝑟8 Loan loss provision/growth loans -0.038 0.037 -0.063 -0.055 0.116 -0.048 0.459 0.751 
𝑟9 Impaired loans/growth loans 0.015 -0.017 0.018 0.017 -0.027 -0.036 0.558 0.714 
          
 Managerial quality         
𝑟10 Cost to income ratio -0.022 -0.052 0.032 0.079 0.211 -0.578 -0.119 0.689 
𝑟11 Net interest margins (NIM) 0.044 -0.156 0.022 -0.083 0.402 0.174 0.048 0.711 
𝑟12 Overheads cost/total assets -0.001 -0.055 0.046 0.020 0.565 -0.162 -0.003 0.633 
𝑟13 Net fees and commissions/total assets -0.034 0.164 -0.030 0.063 0.496 0.088 0.029 0.547 
𝑟14 Net efficiency -0.009 0.485 -0.008 -0.028 -0.001 0.025 0.036 0.613 
𝑟15 Net efficiency with risk factor 0.049 0.464 -0.008 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.079 0.612 
𝑟16 Growth efficiency -0.041 0.487 0.024 0.003 0.007 -0.003 0.059 0.612 
𝑟17 Growth efficiency with risk factor 0.021 0.469 0.010 0.026 0.001 -0.016 -0.062 0.618 
          
 Earnings and profitability         
𝑟18 Return on average assets (ROAAP) 0.053 -0.016 -0.008 0.06 0.085 0.521 -0.107 0.723 
𝑟19 Return on average equity (ROAE) -0.079 -0.045 0.039 0.067 0.106 0.529 -0.079 0.738 
𝑟20 Log (Bank Z-score) 0.065 0.003 0.517 -0.002 -0.001 -0.062 0.016 0.722 
𝑟21 Adjusted ROAAP -0.013 0.040 0.449 -0.016 0.054 0.078 0.100 0.688 
𝑟22 Adjusted ROAE -0.038 0.056 0.407 -0.025 0.067 0.107 0.104 0.843 
𝑟23 Volatility of ROAAP 0.075 0.040 -0.411 -0.008 0.056 0.105 0.137 0.727 
𝑟24 Volatility of ROAEP -0.045 0.056 -0.395 -0.014 0.014 0.001 0.116 0.727 
𝑟25 Volatility of NIM 0.092 -0.083 -0.141 0.047 0.201 -0.009 -0.055 0.844 
          
 Liquidity         
𝑟26 Liquid assets/total assets -0.01 -0.034 0.004 0.577 -0.005 0.039 0.022 0.675 
𝑟27 Liquid assets/ short-term funds 0.037 0.061 -0.047 0.510 -0.027 -0.03 -0.037 0.711 
𝑟28 Liquid assets/total deposits -0.025 0.027 0.009 0.454 0.221 -0.025 0.0045 0.690 
𝑟29 Net loans/total assets 0.027 0.086 -0.052 -0.356 0.296 -0.031 -0.103 0.572 
          
 Overall Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin test        0.713 
Notes: This table reports the outcome of the principal component analysis of 29 CAMEL indicators of bank financial soundness. Columns [3] to [7] show the 
component loadings of each of our seven components retained from the PCA. The numbers in bold have a magnitude above 0.3, suggesting that these ratios are 
relevant in capturing bank financial soundness.   
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Table 7 
The impact of countries’ political systems on the financial soundness of Islamic banks 
 C1 – Capitalization C2 – Efficiency C3 –  Volatility C4 – Liquidity C5 – Charges C6 – Profitability  C7 – Credit risk 
Model  # [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] 
Panel A. Comparing the financial soundness of conventional and Islamic banks: a baseline model  
Islamic 0.892* 
(0.542) 
0.484 
(0.522) 
0.808*** 
(0.227) 
0.486*** 
(0.188) 
-0.48** 
(0.242) 
-0.36 
(0.255) 
-0.164 
(0.298) 
-0.161 
(0.321) 
-0.172 
(0.246) 
-0.118 
(0.254) 
0.535** 
(0.242) 
0.513** 
(0.246) 
-0.517** 
(0.208) 
-0.391* 
(0.228) 
Size -0.83*** 
(0.099) 
-1.04*** 
(0.120) 
0.632*** 
(0.049) 
0.450*** 
(0.0557) 
0.131** 
(0.0523 
0.172*** 
(0.0552) 
-0.19*** 
(0.052) 
-0.19*** 
(0.0644) 
-0.55*** 
(0.069) 
-0.53*** 
(0.0855) 
0.133** 
(0.0552) 
0.121** 
(0.0573) 
-0.36*** 
(0.0611) 
-0.266*** 
(0.0653) 
Loan growth -0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.003* 
(0.003) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
-0.01*** 
(0.002) 
-0.01*** 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
-0.01*** 
(0.002) 
-0.012*** 
(0.002) 
Income diversity -0.209 
(0.346) 
-0.372 
(0.364) 
3.103*** 
(0.275) 
2.847*** 
(0.281) 
-0.915** 
(0.418) 
-0.694* 
(0.415) 
1.398*** 
(0.404) 
1.281*** 
(0.421) 
0.122 
(0.279) 
0.189 
(0.318) 
0.124 
(0.531) 
-0.01 
(0.579) 
0.615 
(0.417) 
0.496* 
(0.301) 
Inflation  0.001 
(0.012) 
 0.014 
(0.013) 
 -0.04** 
(0.016) 
 0.006 
(0.009) 
 -0.007 
(0.008) 
 0.007 
(0.012) 
 0.021 
(0.017) 
GDP growth  0.003 
(0.001) 
 0.018** 
(0.009) 
 0.048*** 
(0.016) 
 0.024*** 
(0.009) 
 -0.005 
(0.006) 
 0.011 
(0.009) 
 -0.059*** 
(0.012) 
LnGDP per capita  0.642*** 
(0.140) 
 0.528*** 
(0.066) 
 0.183** 
(0.079) 
 0.02 
(0.094) 
 -0.093 
(0.096) 
 0.057 
(0.089) 
 -0.188** 
(0.081) 
Intercept 13.26*** 
(1.631) 
10.79*** 
(1.537) 
-10.7*** 
(0.790) 
-12.7*** 
(0.733) 
-1.154 
(0.859) 
-0.202 
(0.920) 
2.368*** 
(0.865) 
2.114** 
(0.904) 
8.821*** 
(1.106) 
9.303*** 
(1.005) 
-2.67*** 
(0.888) 
-3.02*** 
(1.001) 
5.744*** 
(1.020) 
6.142*** 
(1.003) 
Obs. 1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Random effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Overall R2 0.231 0.267 0.565 0.643 0.095 0.131 0.179 0.162 0.178 0.196 0.109 0.128 0.186 0.216 
Wald Chi2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Panel B. Baseline results after controlling for the effect of political systems 
Panel B.1.  A democratic political system 
Islamic 1.139* 
(0.604) 
0.84 
(0.633) 
1.111*** 
(0.263) 
0.838*** 
(0.241) 
-0.98*** 
(0.314) 
-0.825** 
(0.331) 
0.37 
(0.358) 
0.411 
(0.368) 
-0.046 
(0.331) 
-0.00360 
(0.332) 
0.122 
(0.344) 
0.192 
(0.333) 
-0.532* 
(0.285) 
-0.404 
(0.280) 
Democratic (𝛽1)   -0.14*** 
(0.0274) 
-0.11*** 
(0.029) 
-0.005 
(0.020) 
0.047** 
(0.020) 
-0.058** 
(0.025) 
-0.073** 
(0.029) 
0.014 
(0.028) 
0.017 
(0.033) 
0.053* 
(0.029) 
0.0522* 
(0.0307) 
-0.11*** 
(0.029) 
-0.11*** 
(0.0330) 
-0.033 
(0.028) 
-0.061* 
(0.032) 
Democratic 
× Islamic (𝛽2) 
-0.29*** 
(0.0923) 
-0.24*** 
(0.093) 
-0.131** 
(0.053) 
-0.092** 
(0.047) 
0.135** 
(0.063) 
0.119* 
(0.069) 
-0.2*** 
(0.049) 
-0.2*** 
(0.049) 
0.017 
(0.053) 
0.013 
(0.049) 
0.027 
(0.052) 
0.018 
(0.052) 
-0.043 
(0.055) 
-0.065 
(0.054) 
Obs. 1137 1136 1137 1136 1137 1136 1137 1136 1137 1136 1137 1136 1137 1136 
Bank-control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro-control No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Overall R2 0.282 0.289 0.572 0.654 0.11 0.152 0.187 0.171 0.227 0.236 0.205 0.217 0.182 0.221 
Wald Chi2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Test p-value (𝛽1) = (𝛽2) 1.93 1.7 3.83* 6.01** 6.28** 5.45** 9.22*** 9.74*** 0.23 0.31 3.47* 3.17* 0.02 0.01 
Panel B.2. A democratic political system – II 
Islamic -0.027 
(0.432) 
-0.089 
(0.423) 
0.539** 
(0.214) 
0.489*** 
(0.181) 
-0.441* 
(0.249) 
-0.354 
(0.269) 
-0.323 
(0.290) 
-0.293 
(0.304) 
0.017 
(0.200) 
0.03 
(0.205) 
0.148 
(0.238) 
0.182 
(0.236) 
-0.72*** 
(0.228) 
-0.71*** 
(0.245) 
Polity2 (𝛽1) -0.08*** 
(0.014) 
-0.06*** 
(0.015) 
-0.01 
(0.010) 
0.026** 
(0.011) 
-0.03** 
(0.013) 
-0.042*** 
(0.015) 
0.014 
(0.015) 
0.017 
(0.018) 
0.028** 
(0.014) 
0.027* 
(0.015) 
-0.06*** 
(0.014) 
-0.07*** 
(0.017) 
-0.015 
(0.015) 
-0.034** 
(0.017) 
Polity2 
× Islamic (𝛽2) 
-0.11*** 
(0.037) 
-0.092** 
(0.036) 
-0.063** 
(0.027) 
-0.041* 
(0.023) 
0.068** 
(0.030) 
0.064* 
(0.034) 
-0.08*** 
(0.024) 
-0.079*** 
(0.026) 
0.002 
(0.028) 
0.000 
(0.027) 
0.009 
(0.027) 
0.002 
(0.027) 
-0.024 
(0.027) 
-0.042 
(0.027) 
Obs. 1138 1137 1138 1137 1138 1137 1138 1137 1138 1137 1138 1137 1138 1137 
Bank-control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro-control No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Overall R2 0.294 0.295 0.577 0.652 0.107 0.15 0.195 0.182 0.222 0.226 0.218 0.238 0.179 0.216 
Wald Chi2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Test p-value (𝛽1) = (𝛽2) 0.37 0.44 2.58 5.45** 6.9*** 6.95*** 7.19*** 6.9*** 0.5 0.59 4.00*** 3.9** 0.06 0.05 
Panel B.3.  Sound political institutions – I 
Islamic  -0.027 
(0.432) 
-0.089 
(0.423) 
0.539** 
(0.214) 
0.489*** 
(0.181) 
-0.441* 
(0.249) 
-0.354 
(0.269) 
-0.323 
(0.290) 
-0.293 
(0.304) 
0.017 
(0.200) 
0.03 
(0.205) 
0.148 
(0.238) 
0.182 
(0.236) 
-0.72*** 
(0.228) 
-0.71*** 
(0.245) 
Polcon (𝛽1) -0.08*** -0.06*** -0.01 0.026** -0.03** -0.042*** 0.014 0.017 0.028** 0.027* -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.015 -0.034** 
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Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates. In Panel B, we only report the coefficient estimates of Islamic, the political and legal system 
proxies, and their interactions with Islamic to save space. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.  
  
(0.014) (0.0154) (0.010) (0.0110) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) 
Polcon 
× Islamic (𝛽2) 
-0.11*** 
(0.037) 
-0.092** 
(0.036) 
-0.063** 
(0.027) 
-0.041* 
(0.023) 
0.068** 
(0.030) 
0.064* 
(0.034) 
-0.08*** 
(0.024) 
-0.079*** 
(0.026) 
0.002 
(0.028) 
0.000 
(0.027) 
0.009 
(0.027) 
0.002 
(0.027) 
-0.024 
(0.027) 
-0.042 
(0.027) 
Obs. 1138 1137 1138 1137 1138 1137 1138 1137 1138 1137 1138 1137 1138 1137 
Bank-control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro-control No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Overall R2 0.245 0.269 0.565 0.654 0.102 0.142 0.174 0.154 0.3 0.226 0.104 0.121 0.175 0.218 
Wald Chi2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Test p-value (𝛽1) = (𝛽2) 0.65 0.69 1.63 3.41* 3.45* 3.44* 0.12 0.19 11.26*** 12.45*** 1.13 1.15 6.99*** 5.36** 
Panel B.4.  Sound political institutions – II 
Islamic  1.397 
(0.987) 
1.024 
(0.902) 
1.633*** 
(0.322) 
1.258*** 
(0.299) 
-0.855** 
(0.398) 
-0.639 
(0.422) 
0.852* 
(0.435) 
0.885* 
(0.452) 
-0.985*** 
(0.305) 
-0.92*** 
(0.315) 
0.125 
(0.439) 
0.223 
(0.433) 
-0.139 
(0.349) 
-0.052 
(0.358) 
Checks (𝛽1) -0.193** 
(0.075) 
-0.096 
(0.081) 
-0.103 
(0.069) 
0.048 
(0.068) 
-0.101 
(0.0755) 
-0.185** 
(0.085) 
0.051 
(0.073) 
0.064 
(0.082) 
-0.032 
(0.065) 
-0.044 
(0.067) 
-0.28*** 
(0.101) 
-0.31*** 
(0.117) 
0.053 
(0.088) 
0.01 
(0.098) 
Checks  
× Islamic (𝛽2) 
-0.451 
(0.504) 
-0.39 
(0.414) 
-0.61*** 
(0.149) 
-0.49*** 
(0.104) 
0.192 
(0.168) 
0.111 
(0.178) 
-0.64*** 
(0.146) 
-0.658*** 
(0.144) 
0.517*** 
(0.089) 
0.507*** 
(0.088) 
0.1 
(0.179) 
0.069 
(0.183) 
-0.22 
(0.161) 
-0.218 
(0.168) 
Obs. 1153 1152 1153 1152 1153 1152 1153 1152 1153 1152 1153 1152 1153 1152 
Bank-control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro-control No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Overall R2 0.253 0.274 0.573 0.646 0.1 0.147 0.198 0.182 0.177 0.195 0.182 0.198 0.183 0.215 
Wald Chi2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Test p-value (𝛽1) = (𝛽2) 0.25 0.47 7.03*** 12.79*** 1.95 1.86 13.31 14.63*** 14.69*** 15.1*** 2.64 2.32 1.57 1.03 
Panel B.5. Different legal systems 
Western  
× Islamic (𝛽1) 
-1.162** 
(0.500) 
-1.002** 
(0.424) 
0.054 
(0.298) 
0.19 
(0.254) 
-0.033 
(0.369) 
-0.006 
(0.408) 
-1.63*** 
(0.184) 
-1.664*** 
(0.240) 
0.926*** 
(0.205) 
0.928*** 
(0.202) 
0.069 
(0.278) 
0.069 
(0.286) 
-0.83*** 
(0.322) 
-0.86*** 
(0.323) 
Hybrid 
× Islamic (𝛽2) 
1.715** 
(0.682) 
0.921 
(0.733) 
1.084*** 
(0.317) 
0.628** 
(0.272) 
-0.34 
(0.294) 
-0.174 
(0.319) 
0.165 
(0.320) 
0.481 
(0.365) 
-0.859*** 
(0.181) 
-0.87*** 
(0.216) 
0.309 
(0.260) 
0.364 
(0.274) 
-0.413 
(0.267) 
-0.185 
(0.301) 
Sharia’a  
× Islamic (𝛽3) 
2.267*** 
(0.479) 
1.905*** 
(0.640) 
1.62*** 
(0.091) 
1.352*** 
(0.117) 
-1.49*** 
(0.186) 
-1.644*** 
(0.133) 
0.762*** 
(0.229) 
0.778*** 
(0.243) 
1.308*** 
(0.145) 
1.306*** 
(0.150) 
2.699*** 
(0.732) 
2.668*** 
(0.721) 
-0.27*** 
(0.090) 
-0.048 
(0.116) 
Observations 1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 
Bank-control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro-control No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Year dummy No No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Test p-value (𝛽1) = (𝛽3) 25.98*** 15.11*** 28.74*** 19.61*** 13.48*** 15.23*** 85.64 62.21*** 3.45* 3.36* 11.63*** 11.55*** 3.26* 6.13** 
Overall R2 0.234 0.245 0.459 0.549 0.028 0.077 0.125 0.103 0.19 0.191 0.067 0.088 0.162 0.181 
Wald Chi2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
  
45 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8  
The impact of bank age and periods of different economic cycles on the financial soundness of Islamic banks 
 C1 – Capitalization C2 – Efficiency C3 –  Volatility C4 – Liquidity C5 – Charges C6 – Profitability  C7 – Credit risk 
Model  # [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] 
Panel A.  Comparing the financial soundness of conventional and Islamic banks: controlling for the GCC countries and major protests 
Islamic -0.253 
(0.940) 
-0.151 
(0.940) 
0.243 
(0.347) 
0.362 
(0.322) 
-0.092 
(0.318) 
-0.008 
(0.348) 
-0.656 
(0.545) 
-0.595 
(0.562) 
0.214 
(0.366) 
0.221 
(0.368) 
0.625* 
(0.333) 
0.578* 
(0.342) 
-0.747*** 
(0.269) 
-0.9*** 
(0.290) 
GCC (𝛽1) 1.79*** 
(0.256) 
1.139*** 
(0.341) 
0.645*** 
(0.159) 
-0.218 
(0.210) 
0.151 
(0.223) 
0.371 
(0.282) 
-0.63*** 
(0.239) 
-0.91*** 
(0.313) 
-0.6*** 
(0.183) 
-0.579** 
(0.261) 
1.249*** 
(0.176) 
1.604*** 
(0.240) 
-0.043 
(0.147) 
0.563** 
(0.219) 
GCC × Islamic (𝛽2) 0.872 
(1.037) 
0.707 
(1.047) 
0.555 
(0.405) 
0.384 
(0.379) 
-0.722 
(0.468) 
-0.802 
(0.505) 
1.122* 
(0.614) 
1.073* 
(0.634) 
-0.198 
(0.451) 
-0.219 
(0.456) 
-0.896* 
(0.461) 
-0.778* 
(0.456) 
0.526 
(0.359) 
0.748** 
(0.366) 
Major protests (𝛽3) -0.015 
(0.217) 
-0.013 
(0.211) 
-0.234* 
(0.133) 
-0.213 
(0.131) 
0.282 
(0.380) 
0.357 
(0.382) 
-0.159 
(0.168) 
-0.142 
(0.166) 
0.027 
(0.081) 
0.024 
(0.080) 
0.171 
(0.139) 
0.157 
(0.137) 
0.518** 
(0.217) 
0.435** 
(0.194) 
Major protests × Islamic 
(𝛽4) 
-0.854 
(0.602) 
-0.871 
(0.619) 
-0.138 
(0.181) 
-0.151 
(0.185) 
-0.274 
(0.859) 
-0.106 
(0.745) 
0.715 
(0.592) 
0.674 
(0.643) 
-0.168 
(0.295) 
-0.13 
(0.296) 
-0.665* 
(0.385) 
-0.723* 
(0.378) 
-0.773 
(0.523) 
-0.907 
(0.642) 
Intercept 14.09*** 
(1.631) 
12.17*** 
(1.558) 
-10.17*** 
(0.823) 
-12.8*** 
(0.817) 
-1.219 
(0.875) 
0.068 
(1.055) 
2.147** 
(0.873) 
1.255 
(1.016) 
8.492*** 
(1.116) 
8.628*** 
(1.039) 
-2.017** 
(0.856) 
-1.166 
(1.088) 
5.575*** 
(1.017) 
6.772*** 
(1.074) 
Obs. 1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 
Bank and country control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Random effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Overall R2 0.302 0.297 0.592 0.643 0.098 0.139 0.217 0.225 0.214 0.213 0.214 0.25 0.20 0.225 
Wald Chi2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Test p-value (𝛽1) = (𝛽2) 0.66 0.14 0.03 1.58 2.15 3.38* 5.63** 6.45** 0.54 0.41 15.19*** 18.33*** 1.7 0.16 
Test p-value (𝛽3) = (𝛽4) 1.42 1.44 0.11 0.04 0.27 0.22 1.79 1.37 0.37 0.23 3.47* 3.92** 4.15** 3.44* 
Panel B. Comparing Islamic and conventional banks of different ages 
Young × Islamic  1.689 
(1.372) 
1.178 
(1.500) 
0.785 
(0.550) 
0.370 
(0.586) 
-1.07*** 
(0.277) 
-0.843* 
(0.432) 
1.290 
(0.886) 
1.291 
(0.929) 
-0.445 
(0.439) 
-0.372 
(0.438) 
0.205 
(0.540) 
0.166 
(0.557) 
-1.05*** 
(0.405) 
-0.939** 
(0.466) 
Middle-aged × Islamic -0.307 
(1.196) 
-0.091 
(0.916) 
0.0981 
(0.592) 
0.299 
(0.372) 
-0.485 
(0.306) 
-0.441* 
(0.235) 
-0.753** 
(0.365) 
-0.684* 
(0.405) 
-0.123 
(0.729) 
-0.164 
(0.737) 
-0.150 
(0.347) 
-0.093 
(0.340) 
-0.759** 
(0.374) 
-0.895** 
(0.430) 
Mature × Islamic 0.978 
(0.596) 
0.402 
(0.539) 
1.024*** 
(0.237) 
0.574*** 
(0.178) 
-0.330 
(0.336) 
-0.242 
(0.351) 
-0.458** 
(0.228) 
-0.488* 
(0.256) 
-0.068 
(0.275) 
0.006 
(0.283) 
0.868*** 
(0.280) 
0.815*** 
(0.291) 
-0.293 
(0.243) 
-0.076 
(0.254) 
Intercept 13.35*** 
(1.709) 
10.82*** 
(1.593) 
-10.49*** 
(0.839) 
-12.5*** 
(0.774) 
-1.030 
(0.925) 
-0.086 
(0.986) 
2.145** 
(0.861) 
1.852** 
(0.893) 
8.669*** 
(1.139) 
9.147*** 
(1.037) 
-2.93*** 
(0.937) 
-3.34*** 
(1.060) 
5.950*** 
(1.090) 
6.387*** 
(1.071) 
Obs. 1119 1118 1119 1118 1119 1118 1119 1118 1119 1118 1119 1118 1119 1118 
Bank-control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro-control No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Random effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Overall R2 0.229 0.273 0.559 0.639 0.103 0.134 0.197 0.179 0.164 0.182 0.111 0.127 0.186 0.217 
Wald Chi2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Panel C. Comparing Islamic and conventional banks in different periods of the economic cycle 
Before × Islamic 2.403** 
(1.046) 
2.034** 
(0.958) 
2.389*** 
(0.306) 
2.198*** 
(0.201) 
-1.24*** 
(0.440) 
-1.29** 
(0.574) 
0.442 
(0.717) 
0.532 
(0.659) 
1.073 
(0.865) 
1.066 
(0.861) 
2.795*** 
(0.856) 
2.823*** 
(0.850) 
-0.477 
(0.439) 
-0.371 
(0.468) 
During × Islamic   1.073* 
(0.573) 
0.562 
(0.560) 
0.432 
(0.265) 
0.195 
(0.220) 
-0.91*** 
(0.233) 
-0.62** 
(0.258) 
-0.492 
(0.345) 
-0.188 
(0.389) 
0.002 
(0.284) 
-0.007 
(0.299) 
0.872*** 
(0.240) 
0.957*** 
(0.239) 
-0.66*** 
(0.199) 
-0.63*** 
(0.213) 
After × Islamic   0.846 
(0.548)  
0.295 
(0.545) 
0.928*** 
(0.244) 
0.609*** 
(0.204) 
-0.056 
(0.303) 
-0.032 
(0.307) 
-0.216 
(0.288) 
-0.099 
(0.333) 
-0.340 
(0.216) 
-0.352 
(0.232) 
0.122 
(0.231) 
0.112 
(0.239) 
-0.454* 
(0.246) 
-0.242 
(0.273) 
Intercept 8.514*** 
(1.574)  
6.885*** 
(1.487) 
-10.5*** 
(0.767) 
-11.3*** 
(0.756) 
-2.71*** 
(0.958) 
-2.05** 
(1.041) 
5.904*** 
(1.000) 
6.939*** 
(1.111) 
7.752*** 
(1.059) 
7.699*** 
(0.989) 
-1.731** 
(0.855) 
-1.775** 
(0.900) 
6.547*** 
(1.100) 
7.534*** 
(1.118) 
Obs. 1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 
Bank-control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro-control No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Year dummy No No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
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(Continued)  
Notes: We only report the coefficient estimates of interaction terms between Islamic and different proxies of bank age and periods of economic cycles to save space. 
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.
Random effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Overall R2 0.212 0.228 0.461 0.554 0.028 0.076 0.110 0.089 0.174 0.170 0.076 0.105 0.159 0.178 
Wald Chi2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
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Table 9  
The impact of market discipline, dispersion of ownership and countries’ ratings on the financial soundness of conventional and Islamic banks 
Notes: We only report the coefficient estimates of Islamic and of the interaction between Islamic and market discipline, dispersion of ownership and countries’ ratings to save space. 
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates. 
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.
 C1 – Capitalization C2 – Efficiency C3 –  Volatility C4 – Liquidity C5 – Charges C6 – Profitability  C7 – Credit risk 
Model  # [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] 
Panel A. Comparing Islamic and conventional banks under two market conditions (listed and unlisted) 
Listed 
× Islamic (𝛽1) 
1.277** 
(0.535) 
0.553 
(0.504) 
1.189*** 
(0.268) 
0.751*** 
(0.226) 
-0.624** 
(0.312) 
-0.547 
(0.333) 
-0.050 
(0.301) 
0.189 
(0.328) 
-0.176 
(0.325) 
-0.178 
(0.341) 
0.789** 
(0.326) 
0.859** 
(0.334) 
-0.243 
(0.248) 
-0.0236 
(0.251) 
Unlisted 
× Islamic (𝛽2) 
0.525 
(1.050) 
0.426 
(1.020) 
0.305 
(0.414) 
0.350 
(0.349) 
-0.089 
(0.289) 
0.071 
(0.321) 
-0.617 
(0.521) 
-0.484 
(0.604) 
-0.146 
(0.345) 
-0.150 
(0.349) 
-0.152 
(0.334) 
-0.106 
(0.337) 
-0.886*** 
(0.282) 
-0.880*** 
(0.314) 
Intercept 8.281*** 
(1.535) 
6.694*** 
(1.470) 
-10.00*** 
(0.807) 
-10.69*** 
(0.804) 
-3.207*** 
(1.012) 
-2.487** 
(1.111) 
6.273*** 
(1.084) 
7.481*** 
(1.196) 
8.326*** 
(1.105) 
8.268*** 
(1.032) 
-1.294 
(0.905) 
-1.176 
(0.965) 
6.581*** 
(1.151) 
7.518*** 
(1.181) 
Obs. 1102 1101 1102 1101 1102 1101 1102 1101 1102 1101 1102 1101 1102 1101 
Macro-control No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Year dummy No No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Random effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Overall R2 0.189 0.206 0.434 0.522 0.029 0.071 0.113 0.088 0.14 0.141 0.04 0.058 0.153 0.17 
Wald Chi2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Test p-value (𝛽1) = (𝛽2) 0.42 0.01 3.37* 1.03 1.72 1.94 0.94 1.04 0.01 0.01 4.41** 4.58** 3.31* 4.94** 
Panel B. Comparing Islamic and conventional banks in countries with lower risk profile  
Islamic 0.812 
(0.621) 
0.172 
(0.613) 
0.773*** 
(0.222) 
0.537*** 
(0.206) 
-0.618** 
(0.264) 
-0.601** 
(0.289) 
-0.118 
(0.317) 
0.270 
(0.378) 
-0.155 
(0.262) 
-0.192 
(0.272) 
0.125 
(0.275) 
0.004 
(0.284) 
-0.439* 
(0.237) 
-0.257 
(0.267) 
Rating A (𝛽1) -0.0758 
(0.318) 
-1.472*** 
(0.365) 
1.018*** 
(0.253) 
0.418 
(0.270) 
-1.104*** 
(0.302) 
-1.197*** 
(0.333) 
1.195*** 
(0.345) 
1.952*** 
(0.384) 
-0.482 
(0.322) 
-0.558* 
(0.308) 
-1.510*** 
(0.295) 
-1.812*** 
(0.297) 
0.185 
(0.289) 
0.584* 
(0.315) 
Rating A 
× Islamic (𝛽2) 
1.287* 
(0.735) 
0.922 
(0.719) 
1.116** 
(0.438) 
0.919** 
(0.422) 
1.446** 
(0.630) 
1.085 
(0.669) 
-0.708 
(0.631) 
-0.838 
(0.686) 
-0.272 
(0.455) 
-0.275 
(0.469) 
2.140*** 
(0.583) 
1.953*** 
(0.601) 
-0.505 
(0.384) 
-0.181 
(0.391) 
Intercept 8.830*** 
(1.601) 
6.106*** 
(1.526) 
-9.602*** 
(0.782) 
-10.57*** 
(0.835) 
-3.747*** 
(0.946) 
-3.646*** 
(1.164) 
6.713*** 
(0.977) 
8.793*** 
(1.143) 
8.097*** 
(1.066) 
7.949*** 
(0.997) 
-2.550*** 
(0.815) 
-3.410*** 
(0.896) 
6.637*** 
(1.145) 
8.059*** 
(1.245) 
Obs. 1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 
Macro-control No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Year dummy No No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Random effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Overall R2 0.216 0.263 0.492 0.55 0.051 0.086 0.149 0.138 0.09 0.17 0.139 0.19 0.16 0.176 
Wald Chi2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Test p-value (𝛽1) = (𝛽2) 2.14 6.53** 0.02 0.67 9.66** 7.35*** 4.76** 9.29*** 0.18 0.68 21.77*** 23.02*** 1.21 1.55 
Panel C. Comparing Islamic and conventional banks in countries with high risk profile 
Islamic 0.676 
(0.475) 
0.0956 
(0.403) 
0.797*** 
(0.250) 
0.464** 
(0.181) 
-0.392 
(0.245) 
-0.335 
(0.259) 
-0.394 
(0.262) 
-0.250 
(0.297) 
-0.196 
(0.253) 
-0.182 
(0.265) 
0.415 
(0.262) 
0.433 
(0.267) 
-0.495** 
(0.213) 
-0.324 
(0.234) 
Rating C (𝛽1) -1.215 
(0.892) 
-1.116 
(0.792) 
-0.981** 
(0.412) 
-0.890*** 
(0.283) 
0.139 
(0.351) 
0.834** 
(0.368) 
0.585 
(1.010) 
0.865 
(0.940) 
-1.889*** 
(0.274) 
-1.869*** 
(0.253) 
0.007 
(0.320) 
-0.016 
(0.272) 
1.279* 
(0.759) 
0.642 
(0.515) 
Rating C  
×Islamic (𝛽2) 
7.960*** 
(0.952) 
9.150*** 
(0.812) 
2.184*** 
(0.454) 
3.391*** 
(0.306) 
0.347 
(0.382) 
0.871** 
(0.424) 
2.615*** 
(0.986) 
2.860*** 
(0.947) 
1.834*** 
(0.290) 
1.774*** 
(0.310) 
1.413*** 
(0.296) 
1.671*** 
(0.295) 
-1.315* 
(0.774) 
-1.292** 
(0.513) 
Intercept 8.740*** 
(1.537) 
7.147*** 
(1.431) 
-10.41*** 
(0.770) 
-11.17*** 
(0.756) 
-2.825*** 
(0.969) 
-2.252** 
(1.044) 
5.774*** 
(1.003) 
6.829*** 
(1.105) 
8.362*** 
(1.040) 
8.342*** 
(0.968) 
-1.393 
(0.858) 
-1.409 
(0.908) 
6.420*** 
(1.110) 
7.438*** 
(1.128) 
Obs. 1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 
Macro-control No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Year dummy No No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Random effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Overall R2 0.231 0.25 0.46 0.553 0.028 0.073 0.121 0.104 0.172 0.177 0.054 18.16*** 0.166 0.179 
Wald Chi2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Test p-value (𝛽1) = (𝛽2) 27.27*** 45.5*** 15.39*** 73.02*** 0.10 0.01 1.07 0.177 70.81*** 66.86*** 7.94*** 0.081 2.99* 4.32** 
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Table 10 
The financial soundness of Islamic banks: alternative estimation techniques  
Notes: We only report the coefficient estimates of the Islamic dummy to save space. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.  
Panel A. Propensity score matching technique 
Matching 
method 
  C1 – Capitalization C2 – Efficiency C3 –  Volatility C4 – Liquidity C5 – Charges C6 – Profitability  C7 – Credit risk 
Model  #  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] 
K-Nearest neighbors                
n = 2 Treated  0.899 0.899 0.809 0.809 -0.401 -0.401 -0.314 -0.314 0.149 0.149 0.397 0.397 -0.345 -0.349 
 Controls  0.446 0.575 -0.013 0.106 0.101 -0.136 0.191 0.169 0.211 -0.005 0.03 -0.109 0.029 -0.029 
 Difference   0.453 0.325 0.822*** 0.703*** -0.5** -0.265 -0.5** -0.483** -0.062 0.154 0.363* 0.506** -0.378** -0.319* 
 T stat  1.32 0.91 3.69 3.09 -2.16 -1.11 -2.46 -2.3 -0.3 0.7 1.8 2.49 -2.3 -1.93 
                 
n = 5 Treated  0.899 0.899 0.809 0.809 -0.401 -0.401 -0.314 -0.314 0.149 0.149 0.397 0.397 -0.349 -0.349 
 Controls  0.369 0.537 -0.154 0.216 0.069 -0.126 0.182 0.135 0.218 -0.058 -0.069 -0.209 -0.038 0.062 
 Difference   0.531* 0.362 0.963*** 0.593*** -0.47** -0.275 -0.18*** -0.449** -0.069 0.207 2.53** 0.606*** -0.312** -0.41*** 
 T stat  1.75 1.13 4.98 2.91 -2.27 -1.26 -2.79 -2.3 -0.39 1.1 2.53 3.13 -2.36 -2.75 
Kernel                
 Treated  0.831 0.899 0.798 0.809 -0.391 -0.401 -0.365 -0.314 0.139 0.149 0.373 0.397 -0.344 -0.349 
 Controls  0.03 0.328 -0.089 0.228 0.027 -0.072 0.016 0.106 0.048 -0.094 -0.037 -0.082 0.044 -0.26 
 Difference   0.8*** 0.572** 0.888*** 0.581*** -0.42** -0.329* -0.381** -0.42** 0.092 0.243 0.41** 0.479*** -0.39*** -0.32*** 
 T stat  2.93 2.02 5.11 3.28 -2.17 -1.7 -2.47 -2.56 0.58 1.53 2.44 2.8 -3.43 -2.77 
Radius                
 Treated  0.899 0.899 0.809 0.809 -0.401 -0.401 -0.314 -0.314 0.149 0.149 0.397 0.397 -0.349 -0.349 
 Controls  -0.074 -0.076 -0.064 -0.067 0.061 0.063 -0.025 -0.28 -0.032 -0.031 -0.032 -0.033 -0.01 -0.017 
 Difference   0.974*** 0.976*** 0.873*** 0.877*** -0.46** -0.46** -0.289* -0.286* 0.181 0.18 0.429*** 0.431*** -0.34*** -0.33*** 
 T stat  3.54 3.54 5.22 5.24 -2.48 -2.49 -1.84 -1.82 1.19 1.19 2.61 2.62 -3.14 -3.08 
Panel B. Difference in difference estimation technique  
 Baseline                
Diff-in-diff  Treated  0.797 0.797 0.849 0.849 -0.412 -0.412 -0.475 -0.475 0.207 0.207 0.531 0.531 -0.374 -0.374 
(Kernel) Controls  -0.071 0.083 -0.053 -0.133 -0.017 0.025 0.01 -0.027 0.027 0.122 -0.048 -0.003 0.008 -0.062 
 Difference   0.867 0.714 0.902*** 0.982*** -0.395 -0.437 -0.486** -0.448* 0.18 0.085 0.579** 0.534** -0.382 -0.312 
 T stat  1.56 1.28 2.79 3.08 -1.3 -1.47 -2.01 -1.89 0.64 0.3 2.4 2.2 -1.85* -1.55 
                 
 Follow-up                
 Treated  1.265 1.265 0.395 0.395 -0.279 -0.279 0.572 0.572 -0.745 -0.745 -0.473 -0.473 -0.257 -0.257 
 Controls  0.219 -0.045 -1.256 -1.308 1.406 1.56 0.028 -0.067 -0.889 -0.772 0.043 0.114 0.252 1.355 
 Difference   1.046 1.31 1.651** 1.704** -1.68*** -1.838** 0.544 0.638 0.144 0.027 -0.516 -0.587 -0.509 -1.612 
 T stat  0.86 1.21 2.13 2.08 -2.92 -2.5 0.65 0.75 0.51 0.08 -1.08 -1.22 -1.35 -2.87** 
                 
 Diff-in-diff  0.179 0.596 0.749 0.721 -1.299* -1.401* 1.029 1.087 -0.036 -0.058 -1.095** -1.121** -0.126 -1.3** 
Panel C. Other estimation techniques and methods of correcting standard errors  
Panel C.1. Truncated regressions  
Islamic    0.759 
(0.557) 
0.478 
(0.514) 
0.848*** 
(0.172) 
0.486*** 
(0.148) 
-0.456 
(0.279) 
-0.289 
(0.299) 
-0.423* 
(0.255) 
-0.467* 
(0.265) 
0.032 
(0.250) 
0.258 
(0.235) 
0.486** 
(0.220) 
0.473** 
(0.215) 
-0.374* 
(0.196) 
-0.340 
(0.208) 
Obs.   1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 
Year dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald Chi2   0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Panel C.2. Random effect regressions with White standard errors  
Islamic   0.892* 
(0.542) 
0.484 
(0.522) 
0.808*** 
(0.227) 
0.486*** 
(0.188) 
-0.479** 
(0.242) 
-0.360 
(0.255) 
-0.164 
(0.298) 
-0.161 
(0.321) 
-0.172 
(0.246) 
-0.118 
(0.254) 
0.535** 
(0.242) 
0.513** 
(0.246) 
-0.517** 
(0.208) 
-0.391* 
(0.228) 
Obs.   1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 1156 1155 
Year dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Overall R2   0.231 0.267 0.565 0.643 0.095 0.131 0.18 0.162 0.178 0.196 0.109 0.128 0.186 0.216 
Wald Chi2   0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
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Table 11  
The financial soundness of Islamic banks: Addressing endogeneity 
Panel A. IV approach  
Panel A.1. Religion, experience and GCC dummy as instruments 
 First stage  Second stage 
   C1 – Capitalization C2 – Efficiency C3 –  Volatility C4 – Liquidity C5 – Charges C6 – Profitability  C7 – Credit risk 
   2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 
Model  # [1]  [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] 
Islamic   8.107*** 
(0.991) 
7.864*** 
(0.951) 
2.231*** 
(0.489) 
3.105*** 
(0.529) 
-0.958 
(0.671) 
-1.308* 
(0.673) 
-3.42*** 
(0.656) 
-4.486*** 
(0.682) 
-3.25 
(2.609) 
-3.66 
(2.626) 
5.623*** 
(0.838) 
6.476*** 
(0.885) 
-0.062 
(0.534) 
-0.676** 
(0.289) 
Religion 0.131*** 
(0.025) 
               
Experience -0.07** 
(0.031) 
               
GCC dummy 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
               
Obs. 1119  1119 1119 1119 1119 1119 1119 1119 1119 1119 1119 1119 1119 1119 1119 
Bank-control Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro-control No  No No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Year dummy Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald Chi2 0.00***  0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
F-test 32.06***                
Panel A.2. Religion, experience and countries’ fuel exports as instruments 
Islamic   7.416*** 
(1.161) 
7.437*** 
(1.089) 
1.356** 
(0.576) 
2.395*** 
(0.610) 
-1.141 
(0.768) 
-1.323* 
(0.775) 
-3.505*** 
(0.783) 
-4.853*** 
(0.804) 
-1.831 
(1.647) 
-2.52 
(1.663) 
5.594*** 
(0.972) 
7.246*** 
(1.073) 
-0.878 
(0.628) 
-1.866*** 
(0.610) 
Religion 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
               
Experience -0.087*** 
(0.031) 
               
Fuel export 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
               
Obs. 1029  1029 1029 1029 1029 1029 1029 1029 1029 1029 1029 1029 1029 1029 1029 
Bank-control Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro-control No  No No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Year dummy Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald Chi2 0.00***  0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
F-test 28.88***                
Panel B. Heckman estimation technique 
 Selection 
equation 
 Outcome equation 
    
   C1 – Capitalization C2 – Efficiency C3 –  Volatility C4 – Liquidity C5 – Charges C6 – Profitability  C7 – Credit risk 
Model  # [1]  [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] 
Panel B.1. Clustering standard errors at the bank level 
Islamic   0.22 
(0.547) 
0.107 
(0.511) 
0.886*** 
(0.185) 
0.712*** 
(0.149) 
-0.423 
(0.296) 
-0.307 
(0.312) 
-0.079 
(0.280) 
-0.14 
(0.279) 
0.298 
(0.239) 
0.422 
(0.321) 
0.011 
(0.223) 
0.117 
(0.218) 
-0.439** 
(0.218)  
-0.448** 
(0.214) 
Religion 0.016*** 
(0.003) 
               
Experience -0.534*** 
(0.152) 
               
GCC dummy 0.71*** 
(0.123) 
               
Size -0.827** 
(0.349) 
 -0.57*** 
(0.090) 
-0.69*** 
(0.105) 
0.653*** 
(0.046) 
0.438*** 
(0.049) 
0.099** 
(0.049) 
0.157*** 
(0.052) 
-0.192*** 
(0.048) 
-0.252*** 
(0.061) 
-0.352*** 
(0.051) 
-0.22*** 
(0.064) 
0.110** 
(0.054) 
0.134*** 
(0.047) 
-0.246*** 
(0.049) 
-0.199*** 
(0.052) 
Loan growth 0.004 
(0.016) 
 0.005 
(0.004) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.006* 
(0.003) 
-0.005* 
(0.003) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.002) 
0.012*** 
(0.003) 
0.01*** 
(0.003) 
-0.017*** 
(0.003) 
-0.016*** 
(0.002) 
Income diversity -0.398 
(1.089) 
 0.863 
(0.546) 
0.659 
(0.525) 
3.198*** 
(0.395) 
2.615*** 
(0.370) 
-0.992** 
(0.468) 
-0.636 
(0.468) 
2.392*** 
(0.520) 
2.25*** 
(0.534) 
-0.235 
(0.571) 
-0.103 
(0.594) 
-0.246 
(0.441) 
-0.314 
(0.489) 
0.754 
(0.527) 
0.497 
(0.459) 
Inflation    -0.002 
(0.028) 
 0.032* 
(0.016) 
 -0.051** 
(0.020) 
 0.004 
(0.017) 
 0.066*** 
(0.019) 
 0.013 
(0.019) 
 0.032 
(0.020) 
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(Continued) 
Notes: In Panels A.1 and A.2 we only report the coefficient estimates of the Islamic dummy to save space. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
  
GDP growth    0.007 
(0.023) 
 0.013 
(0.013) 
 0.077*** 
(0.017) 
 -0.006 
(0.013) 
 0.002 
(0.013) 
 0.07*** 
(0.015) 
 -0.086*** 
(0.014) 
LnGDP per capita    0.328*** 
(0.113) 
 0.63*** 
(0.061) 
 0.213** 
(0.082) 
 0.167* 
(0.088) 
 -0.26*** 
(0.086) 
 -0.013 
(0.076) 
 -0.087 
(0.084) 
Intercept 22.91*** 
(7.017) 
 9.533*** 
(1.360) 
7.258*** 
(1.471) 
-9.44*** 
(0.755) 
-13.3*** 
(0.704) 
-1.032 
(1.082) 
-0.004 
(2.005) 
2.818*** 
(0.866) 
1.373 
(1.028) 
3.619*** 
(0.753) 
5.131*** 
(1.038) 
 -1.549 
(1.226) 
 6.503*** 
(1.343) 
Inverse Mills   Sig. Sig. Insig. Sig. Insig. Insig. Sig. Sig. Insig. Insig. Sig. Sig. Insig. Insig. 
Obs. 1174  1119 1118 1119 1118 1119 1118 1119 1118 1119 1118 1119 1118 1119 1118 
Year dummy Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2/R2 0.151  0.295 0.317 0.56 0.65 0.11 0.143 0.254 0.262 0.212 0.282 0.225 0.246 0.203 0.247 
F-test   10.41*** 10.32*** 38.62*** 61.31*** 6.79*** 7.74*** 10.74*** 9.61*** 6.68*** 7.3*** 11.08*** 12.01*** 6.91*** 8.31*** 
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Table 12  
Political systems and the financial soundness of Islamic banks: A comparison of the current findings (shown in the final column) with the methodologies and the results of existing studies 
Authors (year) Period 
under 
study 
Countries Main indicators Methodology  Main empirical findings PCA and GLS results 
Capital ratios vs. capital component 
Beck et al. 
(2013) 
1995–
2009 
22 
countries 
Equity to assets Panel data fixed 
effect 
Small Islamic banks are more capitalized 
than conventional banks 
Islamic banks are marginally more capitalized than 
conventional banks 
Abedifar et al. 
(2013) 
1999–
2009  
24 OIC 
countries 
Capital to assets Panel data random 
effect 
No significant difference between the two 
bank types 
 
Alqahtani et al. 
(2016) 
1998–
2013 
6 GCC 
countries 
Capital adequacy and 
equity to assets 
Panel data fixed 
effect 
Islamic banks are more capitalized than 
conventional banks for the 2007–2009 
period  
Capital component shows no significant difference between the 
two bank types in the GCC region. Young Islamic banks are 
more capitalized than conventional banks in the period before 
the 2007–2009 crisis. Publicly listed Islamic banks are more 
capitalized than publicly listed conventional banks. 
      Islamic banks are more capitalized than conventional banks 
in Sharia’a-based legal systems, but less capitalized than 
their conventional counterparts in Western based legal 
systems and more democratic countries 
Efficiency measures vs. efficiency component 
Johnes et al. 
(2014) 
2004–
2009 
19 Muslim 
countries 
Efficiency scores Panel data random 
effect 
Islamic banks are more efficient than 
conventional banks only when compared to 
their own efficiency frontier 
Efficiency component shows that Islamic banks are more 
efficient than conventional banks  
Beck et al. 
(2013) 
1995–
2009 
22 
countries 
Cost to income and 
overheads to assets  
Panel data fixed 
effect 
Large Islamic banks are significantly less 
cost efficient than conventional banks 
 
Alqahtani et al. 
(2016) 
1998–
2013 
6 GCC 
countries 
Cost to income Panel data fixed 
effect 
Islamic banks are less cost efficient than 
conventional banks for the 2009–2013 
period.  
Efficiency component shows no significant difference between 
the bank types in the GCC region. Mature Islamic banks are 
more efficient than conventional banks for the period before 
and after the financial crisis. Publicly listed Islamic banks are 
more efficient than publicly listed conventional banks 
Wanke et al. 
(2016) 
2009–
2013 
Malaysia 
 
Efficiency scores computed 
using a dynamic slacks 
based model 
Monte Carlo 
Markov Chain and 
generalized linear 
mixed models 
Islamic banks are less efficient than 
conventional banks 
 
      Being an Islamic (as opposed to a conventional) bank has 
an overall positive effect on efficiency, but this effect is 
reduced in Western-based legal systems and more 
democratic countries compared to in Sharia’a-based legal 
systems 
Stability measures vs. stability (volatility) component 
Abedifar et al. 
(2013) 
1999–
2009  
24 OIC 
countries 
Z-score and adjusted ROA Panel data random 
effect 
No significant difference between the bank 
types when using Z-score and adjusted 
ROA. Small Islamic banks are more stable 
than conventional banks. 
Islamic banks are less stable (have more volatile earnings) than 
conventional counterparts  
Beck et al. 
(2013) 
1995–
2009 
22 
countries 
Z-score Panel data fixed 
effect 
No significant difference between the bank 
types when using Z-score.  
 
Mollah et al. 
(2016) 
2005–
2013 
14 
countries 
Z-score GLS random effect Overall, no significant difference between 
the bank types, but Islamic banks are less 
stable than conventional banks in the GCC 
region 
Stability (volatility) component shows no significant difference 
between the bank types in the GCC region. The main effect of 
lower stability for Islamic banks is driven by small Islamic 
banks in the periods before and after the financial crisis. 
Boumedienne 
and Caby 
(2013) 
2005–
2009 
9 countries Stock returns GARCH methods Islamic banks are more stable than 
conventional banks 
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Authors (year) Period 
under 
study 
Countries Main indicators Methodology  Main empirical findings PCA and GLS results 
Pappas et al. 
(2012) 
1995–
2010 
20 Middle 
and Far 
Eastern 
countries 
Financial ratios Cox survival 
analysis 
Islamic banks have significantly lower 
failure risk than conventional counterparts 
 
Bourkhis and 
Nabi (2013) 
1998–
2009 
16 
countries 
Z-score GLS random effect Islamic banks are marginally more stable 
than conventional banks 
 
Abedifar et al. 
(2013) 
1999–
2009  
24 OIC 
countries 
Z-score and adjusted ROA Panel data random 
effect 
No significant difference between Islamic 
and conventional banks’ stability in Muslim 
countries 
Being an Islamic (as opposed to a conventional) bank has an 
overall positive effect on stability (i.e. it reduces earnings 
volatility), but this effect is reduced in Sharia’a based legal 
systems compared to Western and more democratic countries. 
Mollah et al. 
(2016) 
2005–
2013 
14 
countries 
Z-score GLS random effect Islamic banks are less stable in Muslim 
countries than conventional banks 
 
Liquidity ratios vs. liquidity component 
Alqahtani et al. 
(2016) 
1998–
2013 
6 GCC 
countries 
Liquid assets to assets and 
liquid assets to deposits and 
short term funding 
Panel data fixed 
effect 
Islamic banks are significantly more liquid 
than conventional banks for the 2008–2012 
period but only when using the liquid assets 
to deposits and short term funding ratios 
Liquidity component shows no significant difference between 
bank types. Islamic banks are marginally more liquid than 
conventional banks in the GCC countries. Middle-aged and 
mature Islamic banks are less liquid than conventional banks, 
while no significant difference is found between small Islamic 
banks and conventional banks 
Beck et al. 
(2013) 
1995–
2009 
22 
countries 
Liquid assets to deposits 
and short term funding 
Panel data fixed 
effect 
Small Islamic banks are more liquid in 
periods of local financial crises  
 
      In comparison to conventional banks, Islamic banks are 
more liquid in Sharia’a-based legal systems, but less liquid 
in Western-based legal systems and more democratic 
countries 
Charges measures vs. Charges component  
Alqahtani et al. 
(2016) 
1998–
2013 
6 GCC 
countries 
Fees and commissions to 
gross income 
Panel data fixed 
effect 
Islamic banks rely less on intermediate 
activities that generate fees and 
commissions 
 
Beck et al. 
(2013) 
1995–
2009 
22 
countries 
Fee income to operating 
income 
Panel data fixed 
effect 
No significant difference between the two 
bank types  
 
Abedifar et al. 
(2013)  
1999–
2009  
24 OIC 
countries 
Net interest margin  Panel data random 
effect 
Islamic banks do not charge higher rates for 
offering Sharia’a compliant products 
Charges component shows no significant difference between 
the bank types 
      In comparison to conventional banks, Islamic banks charge 
less rent for offering Sharia’a compliant financial products 
in a hybrid legal system, but more rent in Western and 
Sharia’a-based legal systems 
Profitability ratios vs. Profitability component  
Alqahtani et al. 
(2016) 
1998–
2013 
6 GCC 
countries 
Return on assets, return on 
equity  
Panel data fixed 
effect 
Islamic banks are more profitable than 
conventional banks for the 2007–2008 
period. The results become negative and 
insignificant for the 2009–2012 period.  
 
Beck et al. 
(2013) 
1995–
2009 
22 
countries 
Return on assets and stock 
returns 
Panel data fixed 
effect 
No significant difference in terms of 
profitability between bank types. Islamic 
banks have higher stock returns during the 
financial crisis 
 
Mollah and 
Zaman (2015) 
2005–
2011 
25 
countries 
Operating profits to average 
equity, operating profits to 
average assets, return on 
assets, return on equity, 
Tobins’ Q  
GLS random effect No significant difference between bank 
types 
 
Mollah et al. 
(2016) 
2005–
2013 
14 
countries 
Return on assets GLS random effect Islamic banks are significantly less 
profitable than conventional banks. 
However, they are more profitable in the 
GCC countries.  
Profitability component shows that mature Islamic banks are 
significantly more profitable than conventional banks, 
especially in the period before and during the financial crisis. 
Islamic banks are slightly less profitable in the GCC region 
than conventional banks. Publicly listed Islamic banks are more 
profitable than publicly listed conventional banks 
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Authors (year) Period 
under 
study 
Countries Main indicators Methodology  Main empirical findings PCA and GLS results 
Mollah et al. 
(2016) 
2005–
2013 
14 
countries 
Return on assets GLS random effect Islamic banks are less profitable in Muslim 
countries than conventional banks 
Islamic banks are more profitable than conventional banks in 
Sharia’a based legal systems 
Mollah and 
Zaman (2015) 
2005–
2011 
25 
countries 
Operating profits to average 
equity, operating profits to 
average assets, return on 
assets, return on equity, 
Tobins’ Q  
GLS random effect Operating in a country with a majority 
Muslim population is positively associated 
with the profitability of Islamic banks  
 
Credit risk ratios vs. credit risk component 
Abedifar et al. 
(2013) 
1999–
2009  
24 OIC 
countries 
Loan loss reserves Panel data random 
effect 
Small Islamic banks have lower credit risk 
than conventional banks 
 
Beck et al. 
(2013) 
1995–
2009 
22 
countries 
Loan loss reserves, loan 
loss provisions, non-
performing loans 
Panel data fixed 
effect 
No significant difference between bank 
types when using loan loss reserves and loan 
loss provisions. Small and middle-aged 
Islamic banks have lower credit risk when 
using non-performing loans especially 
during the crisis period 
Young and middle-aged Islamic banks have lower credit risk 
than conventional counterparts, especially during the crisis 
period. Unlisted Islamic banks have lower credit risk than listed 
conventional banks 
Alqahtani et al. 
(2016) 
1998–
2013 
6 GCC 
countries 
Non-performing loans and 
loan loss provisions, all 
scaled by gross loans  
Panel data fixed 
effect 
No significant difference between bank 
types   
 
Abedifar et al. 
(2013) 
1999–
2009  
24 OIC 
countries 
Loan loss reserves Panel data random 
effect 
Islamic banks have lower credit risk than 
conventional banks in Muslim and Sharia’a 
based legal systems 
Islamic banks have lower credit risk in both Western and 
Sharia’a based legal systems, compared to conventional banks 
(Continued) 
The “PCA and GLS results” column in Table 12 shows the current PCA results, to facilitate comparison with the methodologies and the results of existing studies. These studies examine the capital, efficiency, volatility 
of returns, liquidity, charges for Sharia’a compliant financial products, profitability, and credit risk for conventional and Islamic banks. The sentences in bold in the final column present new evidence on the effect of 
political systems (Western democracies vs. Sharia’a-based and hybrid legal systems) on the financial soundness of Islamic banks. 
